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Abstract
Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is
only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for
frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and
they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple exper-
iments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: i) farmers are willing to incur sizable
costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, ii) poor contract enforce-
ment, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments.
We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its
additional predictions.
Keywords: Commitment; Contract Enforcement; Saving Constraints; Agricultural
Markets; Interlinked Transactions.
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.1 Introduction
Despite a great deal of evidence showing that individual preferences are often time-
inconsistent, there is only scarce field evidence of willingness to incur sizable costs for commit-
ment (Laibson, 2015; DellaVigna, 2017). In addition, most of the experimental evidence on
demand for commitment relies on commitment products designed by behavioral economists,
not on the analysis of commitment devices that exist in the market (Laibson, 2018).
This paper studies infrequent payments as a commitment device. Infrequent payments for
frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many goods and labor mar-
kets. They combine many small payments in one lump sum and thus may provide a natural
commitment device to save for lumpy expenses. We show experimentally that Kenyan dairy
farmers are willing to sell milk to a given buyer at substantially lower prices if they receive
infrequent payments and that demand for commitment is an important driver of this prefer-
ence. Additional experiments, however, show that many buyers lack the credibility to offer
infrequent payments, thus limiting competition in the provision of this commitment prod-
uct. Infrequent payments may provide financial commitment effectively, but poor contract
enforcement increases the cost at which they are offered.
In the study setting, farmers supply milk daily to a large buyer (a cooperative) or to
small, itinerant traders. The large buyer pays farmers once a month, traders pay mostly
on a daily basis. In two “demand experiments”, the large buyer privately offers farmers the
option to choose between different payment frequencies for the subsequent month. In the
first experiment, 86% of farmers pick monthly payments over daily payments even when the
price for daily payments is 15% higher. In the second experiment, 93% of farmers turn down
the option to choose every day whether to be paid that day or at the end of the month, thus
preferring to “tie their hands” at the beginning of the month. The choice of this dominated
strategy suggests that farmers value specifically the commitment that infrequent payments
provide. Other potential benefits of infrequent payments, like lower transaction costs, cannot
explain this choice. Additional lab-in-the-field experiments support this interpretation.
The price of this commitment device, and thus the welfare implications for farmers,
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depend on whether the market offers these services competitively or not (DellaVigna and
Malmendier, 2004). We thus also study the supply side of infrequent payments (i.e., the
demand side of the milk market). A puzzling aspect of our context is that, despite the
existence of many buyers competing to buy milk, only the large buyer pays monthly. Unlike
daily payments, monthly payments require the seller to trust that the buyer will pay the
due balance at the end of the month. Two lab-in-the-field “supply experiments” —in which
we endow farmers with additional milk and match them with traders from the same village
—show that lack of credibility constrains traders’ ability to offer monthly payments. When we
exogenously make traders credible, farmers’ willingness to sell to them for monthly payments
(vs. daily payments) raises from 14% to 90%. An additional experimental design shows that
farmers are worried about traders’ strategic default, not about traders’ ability to hold money
until the end of the month (i.e., not about traders also being saving constrained).
These results establish that producers have a strong demand for infrequent payments but
that poor contract enforcement limits many buyers in their ability to supply them. They
raise several questions: how do monthly payments facilitate commitment despite farmers also
selling for daily payments to traders? And why can’t small traders commit to offer monthly
payments despite interacting with farmers on a repeated basis?
To shed light on these and other questions, we develop a model of demand and supply
of infrequent payments. The framework features sophisticated βδ producers who can save
to buy an indivisible good and can sell their output to buyers of heterogeneous credibility.
Imperfect contract enforcement implies buyers can default on monthly payments and thus
contracts must be self-enforcing. By preventing selves during the month from diverting the
amount saved up to that point, monthly payments provide commitment and naturally arise
in equilibrium. The commitment, however, is expensive: imperfect contract enforcement
limits competition in the purchase prices for monthly payments. To be credible, a buyer
must earn rents and thus the prices for delayed monthly payments are lower than for daily
payments, i.e., the market features a negative interest rate. Furthermore, the most credible
buyer sets a monthly price that is high enough to prevent entry of less credible competitors
in the lucrative monthly payment market. A small-scale lab-in-the-field experiment confirms
that, indeed, many traders would be willing to offer monthly payments at prevailing prices.
A calibration of their incentive constraint, however, shows they would not be able to do so
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credibly, in line with the experimental findings. Finally, additional experimental evidence
sheds light on how sale responses to price increases depend on buyer credibility and payment
frequency.
Infrequent payments are common in many contexts, including other agricultural chains
and labor markets. In the concluding section, we present original survey data from a tea
contract farming scheme in Kenya; manufacturing sector workers in Myanmar; and seasonal
workers in Rwanda. These surveys suggest a strong demand for infrequent payments, related
to saving goals. More broadly, the historical shift toward (semi-)monthly wage payments
(Engerman and Goldin, 1991) might have fostered durable purchase among the “middle
class” employed in salaried jobs (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; Gollin, 2002).1
Demand for infrequent payments may be relevant in developed countries as well. For
example, Thaler (1994) mentions that people like tax refunds and Adams et al. (2009) doc-
uments an increase in car purchases among low income people in the tax rebate season.
Many countries instituted Thirteenth Salaries to provide more liquidity around Christmas
expenses. While these institutions and patterns are consistent with a commitment purpose,
other forces could also explain them (for instance, uncertainty (Highfill et al., 1998) or inertia
(Jones, 2012) may explain tax overwithholding), and we are not aware of direct evidence on
their commitment role. In addition, a literature on payday effects in rich countries implies
that increasing the frequency of payments may enhance welfare by improving consumption
smoothing (see, e.g., Stephens, 2003; Shapiro, 2005). Our results suggest that less frequent
payments may on the other hand help for lumpy purchases and saving. From a policy angle,
the demand for infrequent payments may thus have implications for cash transfer design in
both poor and rich countries alike (Banerjee, 2016).2
There is by now abundant evidence that individual preferences are time-inconsistent and
that commitment devices help in choices as diverse as saving, effort provision, and smoking
1Rutherford (2000) documents the importance of lump sums for the poor. Bauer et al. (2012) argues
that demand for lump sums may drive a correlation between present-biased preferences and demand for
microcredit while Afzal et al. (2017) argues that it may explain simultaneous demand for saving and credit
contracts. Our experimental evidence is consistent with poor households receiving negative interest rates on
savings, for instance on deposits to money collectors (Collins et al., 2009). A large literature has focused on
Roscas, which often pay negative returns and might also help overcome self-control problems (e.g., Gugerty,
2007). Roscas however also help deal with requests from friends and family members, provide insurance,
have lower transaction costs and other benefits (Besley et al., 1995).
2In personal communication, Paul Niehaus reported to us that, in ongoing work, recipient of Give Directly
transfers display strong preferences for infrequent disbursements.
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(see Duflo et al., 2011 on fertilizer use among maize farmers in Kenya and Bryan et al., 2010
for a review). While these papers are consistent with a demand for commitment, they do
not provide evidence that subjects are willing to pay for it. Indeed, despite this substantial
body of results, there is only scarce field evidence of willingness to incur sizable costs for
commitment (Laibson, 2015; DellaVigna, 2017). For example, in the pioneering study by
Ashraf et al. (2006), those subjects who opt for commitment (28%) do not actually have
to pay for it. In Augenblick et al. (2015), demand for commitment (on effort provision) is
virtually zero when the cost is 25 cents. In Beshears et al. (2011), only about a quarter of
the subjects are willing to incur a very small cost for the commitment plan. One exception
is a recent paper by Schilbach (forthcoming) who, in a sample of Chennai rickshaw peddlers,
finds that over a third prefer incentives for sobriety over unconditional payments, even when
the unconditional payments were strictly higher.3 Those subjects exhibit a demand for
commitment on non-financial behavior. In contrast, we show a very large demand for financial
commitment achieved through costly infrequent payments.
The paper thus contributes to the broader literature on saving constraints and saving
products as well (see, e.g., Dupas and Robinson, 2013a; Karlan et al., 2014). Several recent
papers focus on the mode of payment. i.e., cash vs. direct deposit (see, e.g., Brune et al.,
2016 and Blumenstock et al., forthcoming). We instead focus on demand for and (constraints
to) the supply of infrequent payments. Importantly, in our setting, farmers prefer infrequent
payments even when the mode of payment between monthly and daily payments is the same
(mobile money transfer), as shown in the above supply experiments. Our results suggest
that, in an environment in which agents do have access to liquid forms of payment, infrequent
payments help with lumpy expenses, a mechanism in line with evidence in Haushofer and
Shapiro (2016) and Brune and Kerwin (2017).
Finally, since infrequent payments are de facto a saving commitment product, the transac-
tions of milk and of saving services occur together, and thus are interlinked (Bardhan, 1991).
A large literature has documented how credit constraints generate interlinkages between the
exchange of goods, labor, and credit services.4 This paper contributes to this literature by
3The interested reader may refer to an updated and comprehensive survey table of the literature in
Schilbach (forthcoming).
4Classic examples include interlinkages of credit with crop sales (Bell, 1988), land tenancy (Braverman
and Stiglitz, 1982) and labor provision (Bardhan, 1983; Mukherjee and Ray, 1995). Casaburi and Reed
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uncovering a previously unnoticed interlinkage between the transaction of goods and saving
services, generated by saving constraints. The proposed mechanism is also distinct from
standard trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Breza and Liberman, 2017). Trade credit
arises from a buyer’s demand to reduce working capital requirements by delaying the timing
of payments. In our mechanism, instead, saving-constrained sellers value delayed lump sums
from credible buyers (or employers), as these help address self-control issues in spending
habits. The paper thus complements Kaur et al. (2010) and Kaur et al. (2015) argument
that the modern factory system might help address self-control problems in effort provision.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
the study setting. Section 3 presents two demand experiments, which show that farmers value
infrequent payments as a commitment device. Section 4 presents two supply experiments,
which show that buyer’s credibility affects farmers’ willingness to sell for monthly payments
and that lack of credibility arises primarily from strategic default concerns. Section 5 presents
a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and tests its implications. Section 6
concludes, presenting survey evidence on the relevance of the mechanisms proposed here for
other markets and discussing policy implications.
2 Study Setting
The dairy industry is the largest agricultural sector in Kenya, contributing to approx-
imately 14% of agricultural GDP and 3.5% of total GDP (Government of Kenya, 2012).
Small-scale farmers, typically owning between one and three cows, are responsible for about
80% of the production (Wambugu et al., 2011). Our project takes places in Kiambu County,
in Central Kenya. Two main types of buyers coexist in the region. The first is a large coop
with about 2,000 members, one of the oldest in the industry. The coop collects milk at
24 collection centers, which are open at fixed hours every day in the morning and in the
afternoon. The second is a large number of informal traders purchasing smaller quantities
of milk. These are primarily small itinerant traders who deliver milk to the nearby towns
(2017), Casaburi and Willis (forthcoming), Ghani and Reed (2017) and Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015a)
offer recent empirical contributions. Imperfect contract enforcement lies at the heart of this literature. See,
e.g. Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015b), Blouin and Macchiavello (2017) and, for a creative experimental
approach, Bubb et al. (2016). More broadly, we build on the large literature on agricultural markets and
institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa (Fafchamps, 2003).
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or local restaurants and to Nairobi (about one hour away). Both types of buyers sell milk
to processors or to final consumers (local or in Nairobi). Approximately half of the dairy
farmers in the coop’s catchment area regularly sell milk to the coop (40% in a listing of all
dairy farmers that we conducted in six random villages).
Farmers milk cows twice a day (morning and afternoon). Since most farmers lack refriger-
ators, sales also typically occur twice a day. The coop and the traders differ in their frequency
of payment. The coop pays farmers once a month, typically the first week of the subsequent
month for deliveries, mostly through direct deposits into the farmer bank account. Traders
pay mostly on a daily basis and sometimes weekly, in cash or through M-Pesa. Appendix
B.2 provides more details on the buyers and on the differences across them.
Initial focus groups suggested that farmers value the coop’s monthly payment as a saving
device. We then conducted a survey with approximately 600 farmers that sell both to the
coop and to traders (this serves as the baseline for the randomized controlled trial described
in Section 5.2). 95% of the respondents prefer that the coop pay at the end of month, rather
than daily or weekly. Figure 1-Panel A shows that 82% of the farmers state that they set
saving goals and that, among these farmers, 87% state they reach these goals most of the
time, 71% that the coop helps reach these goals and 79% that they would be less likely to
reach the saving goals if the coop paid weekly. The survey also suggested that credibility
may be important in shaping a buyer’s ability to supply infrequent payments. Figure 1-Panel
B shows that farmers do not want the traders to provide less frequent payments: Only 18%
of the farmers would like traders to pay less often. Moreover, when asked about the main
reason for this preference, 68% of these respondents state that they are worried traders would
default on the contract (“escape”) if left with holding too much money from the farmers.
In summary, based on this survey descriptive evidence, we hypothesize that farmers may
value infrequent payments and that credibility largely affects a buyer’s ability to provide
infrequent payments to farmers. The experiments presented in Section 3 and 4 test these
hypotheses.
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3 Producers’ Demand for Infrequent Payments
This section provides experimental evidence on whether and why farmers value infrequent
payments. A first experiment shows that farmers selling to the coop are willing to accept a
15% lower price to receive monthly payments rather than daily payments. A second experi-
ment shows that farmers value specifically the commitment offered by infrequent payments.
Both experiments were conducted in Fall 2014. We also present additional lab-in-the-field
and survey evidence.
3.1 Demand Experiment 1: Do Producers Value Infrequent Pay-
ments?
Our main hypothesis is that farmers have a demand for coop’s infrequent payments. If this
is correct, farmers should be “willing to pay” for infrequent payments. The first experiment
(DE1 ) aims at testing if farmers value infrequent payments:
Demand Experiment 1 (DE1): Farmers choose between two options concerning pay-
ments for their deliveries to the coop in the subsequent month: i) daily payments, at a 15%
higher price, or ii) monthly payments.
The experiment identifies farmers’ demand for infrequent payments holding constant other
features of the coop’s demand (for example, other potential benefits, such as inputs, loans,
demand reliability, or an intrinsic preferences for selling to the coop.) The coop management
informed farmers that the coop was piloting new payment systems to offer a better service
and increase deliveries from members. The coop offered farmers a price increase of 5 Kenyan
shillings per liter (a 15% increase) if they chose the daily payment. The meeting where
information was provided and choices were made was held privately, in individual meeting
locations. The experiment targeted a sample of 102 active members, randomly drawn from a
list of farmers selling to the coop. 96 of these 102 farmers completed the experiment (94.1%).
Farmers choosing monthly payments were paid through direct deposit. Farmers opting
for the daily payment were given the choice of being paid in cash or through mobile money
transfers (it was not logistically feasible for the coop to arrange for daily direct deposits in the
bank account). While the availability of these two options reduces differences in transaction
costs between daily and monthly payments, any remaining difference may contribute to a
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preference for monthly payments. Therefore, Demand Experiment 1 does not aim to unbundle
the multiple reasons why farmers may prefer infrequent payments. In the next section, we
present the design of a second demand experiment, which isolates demand for commitment.
Furthermore, we delve into the transaction cost issue in in Section 3.3.
3.2 Demand Experiment 2: Do Producers Value Commitment?
Why would farmers value infrequent payments? A second demand experiment tests
whether the demand for commitment is an important determinant of the demand for in-
frequent payments. We elicit whether farmers are willing to forgo flexibility to retain com-
mitment. The second demand experiment is as follows:
Demand Experiment 2 (DE2): Farmers choose between two options concerning pay-
ment for their deliveries to the coop in the subsequent month: i) a “flexibility” option that,
each day, allows farmers to choose whether to be paid that day or at the end of the month
for milk delivered that day, or ii) monthly payments.
DE2 targeted another sample of 100 active members (drawn from the same population
as DE1 ), reaching 95 of these. The coop offered these farmers a “flexible option” that allows
them to choose every day whether they wanted to be paid daily or at the end of the month
for their deliveries. Regardless of the option chosen (i.e., flexibility or monthly payments),
farmers received an extra of KSh 5 per liter of milk delivered for that month. The farmer
retained control every day on whether to exercise the option to be paid daily or not. As in
DE1, farmers exercising the flexible payment option could choose whether to be paid in cash
or via mobile money transfer.
The main idea behind DE2 is that, through the flexible payment option, farmers can
always replicate the cash flow profile of the monthly payment (if the farmer never exercises
the daily payment option). Without the demand for commitment, the flexible payment then
is strictly better if there is minimal uncertainty on daily cash needs or on traders’ availability
and prices (and weakly better otherwise).5 In particular, if the only barriers to savings were
theft concerns, transaction costs, or family pressure, but not self-control problems, farmers
5In addition, the KSh 5 price increase is higher than the trader prices for about half of the farmers. For
these farmers, even without uncertainty, the flexibility option thus still makes it harder to commit since
offering cash at the point of sale induces a stronger temptation for the farmer.
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should choose the flexibility to get daily payments in any given day they may need them (e.g.
if cash needs in any given day are particularly high). DE2 thus tests whether demand for
commitment is a driver of the demand for infrequent payments. Table 1-Panel A presents
summary statistics on the farmers who participated in the demand experiments.
3.3 Demand Experiments: Results
Farmers’ Choices. In DE1, a large majority of farmers (86%) is willing to forgo a 15%
price increase to have monthly payments. The first bar in Figure 2 illustrates the results.
Most farmers have high demand for infrequent payments from the coop. The second bar in
Figure 2 summarizes the results of DE2. A very high share of farmers, 93%, turns down
the flexibility option. The combination of the two designs suggests that, while other reasons
like transaction costs or safety concerns may also play a role, demand for commitment is a
primary driver of demand for infrequent payments.6
Additional survey evidence supports the experimental results. We asked farmers the moti-
vation for their choices. When eliciting the motivations, enumerators coded the respondent’s
answer without prompting options. Farmers who choose infrequent payments mention that
they try to achieve saving targets (47% in DE1, 42% in DE2 ) and that they do not trust
themselves to handle the cash properly (26%, 36%).7 As we describe in Appendix B.1, the
experimental results are also consistent with descriptive evidence from survey data on: cor-
relation between farmer characteristics and self-reported saving goals and habits (Appendix
Table C.1); spending habits across income paid at different frequency (Appendix Figure C.1),
and sorting across farmers into selling to the coop based on saving goals (Appendix Table
C.2). Farmers’ demand for infrequent payments is also consistent with the observed market
price gap between monthly and daily payments: traders, who mostly pay daily, typically pay
farmers a price per liter that is about 20% higher than the coop, who pays monthly (e.g.,
6Farmers selling to the coop typically make more than half of their sales to the coop. The fact that
most farmers choose monthly payments implies that, in these experiments, we cannot study how sales to the
coop respond to different frequencies of payments. In addition, the low variation in the choices of farmers in
both DE1 and DE2 implies that we do not find consistent correlation patterns between choices and farmer
characteristics.
714% in DE1 and 17% in DE2 mention that the spouse (typically the husband) wants to receive money
on the coop account at the end of the month, suggesting that, in these cases, the wife, while managing the
dairy business, does not have the authority to change the payment frequency.
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KSh 38 vs. KSh 31 in October 2014; this gap is stable across seasons and years). Obviously,
many other differences between the coop and the itinerant traders may contribute to this
gap, though.8
When considering these results, it is important to take into account that the demand
experiments targeted only farmers selling to the coop. However, around the time of the
demand experiments, we conducted a listing of all the dairy farmers in a random sample
of six villages in the coop catchment area. In the listing, 40% of farmers sell to the coop
(this is quite consistent with coop staff telling us that the coop sources milk from about
half of the dairy farmers). Therefore, under the extremely conservative assumption that
none of the other farmers would want infrequent payments, the share of farmers who choose
infrequent payments at a 15% lower price would still be 0.4*0.86=0.34. This is still very high
relative to most of the existing literature on demand for commitment. It would be in line
with Schilbach (forthcoming), who finds that about a third of study participants preferred
incentives for sobriety over unconditional payments, even when the unconditional payments
were strictly higher. Obviously, this is a very conservative lower bound since some non-coop
farmers may also value infrequent payments. For instance, while there is a positive correlation
between selling to the coop and having saving goals (Appendix Table C.2), 66% of non-coop
farmers still report having saving goals (vs. 87% of the coop ones).
The Distribution of Demand for Infrequent Payments. In the implementation
of the two demand experiments, we were constrained by the coop’s request to offer treat-
ments at one price point only. Therefore, the experimental results are not informative of
the distribution of farmers’ demand for infrequent payments. For this purpose, we imple-
mented an additional small lab-in-the-field experiment. The incentivized experiment elicited
the farmer’s reservation price for daily vs. monthly payment for an endowment of three liters
of milk (approximately 30% of a cow’s daily production). If farmers choose the monthly
payment option, they receive the payment for this milk through bank deposit at the end of
the month, together with the payment for the rest of their milk sales to the coop. If they
choose daily payment, they are paid immediately and have the option to receive the payment
8For instance, the coop provides training and veterinary services and its demand may be more reliable
in peak production season. Few farmers buy inputs on credit from the coop. In the year of the study, the
coop did not make second payments to farmers at the end of the year (i.e. no profit-sharing). Appendix B.2
provides more further details.
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in cash or mobile money.
Figure 3 shows that essentially no farmer chooses daily payments if the price is lower
or equal to the one offered by the coop for monthly payments. The percentage of farmers
choosing daily payment increases to 80% when the price gap increases to 10 KSh, i.e., one-
third of the coop’s monthly price. Although the results cannot be directly compared to those
of the field demand experiments (where farmers had to make a decision for the entire month),
they confirm farmers’ willingness to incur costs to receive infrequent payments: the median
willingness to pay for the end-of-month payments is between 13 and 23 percent of the milk
price (approximately 60% of farmers accept a 13% reduction and 40% a 23% reduction)9
Status Quo Bias, Costs of Thinking. A potential concern with the experimental
designs is that, since the coop pays monthly, farmers’ choices may be driven by status quo
bias (see, e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988 and Kahneman et al., 1991). Several pieces
of evidence mitigate this concern. First, farmers’ motivations to choose monthly payments
are mostly consistent with a demand for infrequent payments, arising from a demand for
commitment. Second, the results of the additional lab-in-the-field experiments in Figure 3
show that many farmers do switch if given sufficient incentives to do so. Third, in Section
4, we present a supply experiment where the vast majority of farmers is willing to sell for
monthly payments (vs. daily payments) to small traders when experimental manipulation
makes these traders sufficiently credible. This is a stark departure from the status quo.
Fourth, Casaburi and Macchiavello (2015) shows that farmers in the same population do
respond to a change in the incentives provided by the coop, when this threatened stricter
enforcement against side-selling. In sum, besides the direct evidence from the survey, there
is abundant evidence that farmers in the sample are willing to switch between different
payments frequencies (and, more generally, to change their supply behavior) if they are given
incentives to do so.
Another possible explanation for the results of DE2 is that farmers may dislike the flex-
ibility option because they want to avoid a daily “cost of thinking” (Ortoleva, 2013) or a
“cost of keeping track” (Haushofer, 2015). Relatedly, farmers may worry that the coop may
not be able to keep track of the payment preferences on a daily basis. However, if these were
9Since more farmers sell to the coop in the morning than in the afternoon, in this lab-in-the-field ex-
periment we also tested whether willingness to pay for commitment was higher in the afternoon. Results,
however, show no difference in the required price to accept daily payments across times of the day.
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the only motivations driving the results of DE2, as opposed to a demand for a commitment
device, farmers should choose once and for all the daily payment over the monthly option in
DE1. Similarly, even in DE2, farmers could simply inform the coop at the beginning of the
month that they wanted to get paid daily for the rest of the month.
Why Such a Large Demand for Infrequent Payments? Our experimental results
thus show that farmers have a strong demand for the commitment offered by infrequent
payments. What could drive such a large demand? We hypothesize that infrequent payments
have better commitment properties than other saving products. Farmers do have access to
other saving tools including, possibly, commitment ones: 65% are members of saving groups
and 75% save in a bank account. Further, commitment saving products, like the mobile-
based M-Shwari Lock Saving Account, are available in Kenya (Bharadwaj et al., 2018).10 So,
why would the costly infrequent payment from the coop be a better commitment tool?
Infrequent payments may address demand for commitment in a natural and effective way
for several reasons. First, money is withheld from the farmers until the end of the payment
period. Time-inconsistent depositors who subscribe to a commitment saving account may
never have money to deposit “right this minute”, precisely because of their present bias.
Infrequent payments, instead, commit farmers to have money taken from them until the end
of the month, thus solving the problem. Second, a large, credible buyer (like the cooperative
in our setting) may be able to overcome trust concerns—an argument we fully develop in the
next section—and lack of knowledge of the financial provider (see Jack and Habyarimana,
2018). Third, the model in Section 5.1 highlights that a buyer can put pressure on the farmers
to ensure deliveries, thus further helping them to achieve commitment. The punishment for
side selling embedded in the relational contract with the coop may help the farmer overcome
her temptations.11
The above points clarify that even the introduction of a new commitment saving account
10We note, however, that these commitment products often feature additional fees or reduced interest for
early withdrawals, rather than a full limitation of access. As an example, the M-Shwari Lock Saving Account
penalizes early withdrawals with a mere interest rate reduction of one percentage point. In addition, saving
accounts with commitment features offered by commercial banks require an average initial deposit of $430,
an order of magnitude larger than the monthly revenues for most coop members (Ravi and Tyler, 2012).
11The coop sends warning letters to members who do not make enough sales or disqualifies these members
from service provision (for instance, in February 2014, i.e., eight months before the demand experiments).
In a few cases, it expels members who do not sell at all, though it tolerates sales to traders in the afternoon.
Casaburi and Macchiavello (2015) provides additional details.
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with very harsh early withdrawal fees may not be enough to replace the infrequent payments
as a saving device. Besides the illiquidity, the new saving product should have other important
properties: automatically taking away milk earnings from the farmer at least until the end of
the month; sufficient trust and knowledge toward the financial institution, “forced” deposits
and punishment for non-deposits (akin to the relational contract argument described above).
Understanding the impact on the provision of saving products on sale behavior (possibly with
experimental variation in some of the above commitment features) is an interesting research
question for future work.
Transaction Costs and Other-Control. Besides helping with self-control, infre-
quent payments may certainly have other benefits. We discuss two main potential benefits:
reductions in transaction costs and reductions in other-control concerns.
In the demand experiments, farmers receive monthly payments through direct deposit
in bank accounts and daily payments in cash or through mobile money. As discussed in
Section 3.1, the differences in transaction costs across different modes of payments may in
principle drive the results of DE1. For instance, farmers may prefer direct deposit to mobile
money transfers because mobile money has withdrawal fees (however, except for very small
transactions, this fee is smaller than the price difference of DE1 ). Similarly, farmers may
prefer direct deposit to the bank over cash because of safety concerns or because of the
transaction costs (e.g. travel time) they would face when depositing daily payments in the
bank account.12
Two considerations, however, suggest that differences in transaction costs are unlikely to
explain the large demand for monthly payments in our setting. First, in the Supply Exper-
iments presented in Section 4, farmers receive both daily and monthly payments under the
same mode of payment (i.e., mobile money transfers). As we will see, in these experiments,
farmers still exhibit high demand for infrequent payments (if buyers are credible). Second,
lower transaction costs alone are unlikely to explain results in DE2. If the only difference
between monthly payments and daily payments were transaction costs (rather than commit-
12A recent empirical literature documents how the mode of payment (i.e., cash vs. direct deposit) af-
fects saving and spending. See, e.g., Brune et al. (2016), Brune et al. (2017), Somville and Vandewalle
(forthcoming), Blumenstock et al. (forthcoming). Among others, Dupas and Robinson (2013a), Dupas and
Robinson (2013b), Prina (2015), Kast and Pomeranz (2014), and Callen et al. (2016) study the impact of
saving products in developing countries.
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ment concerns), a farmer should always opt to retain the flexibility to choose daily payments
in any given day in which the marginal utility from daily consumption is larger than the
difference in transaction costs. To summarize, while we acknowledge that lower transaction
costs may be an additional benefit of infrequent payments, our experimental designs, results,
and qualitative evidence strongly suggest they are not a main driver of the strong preference
for infrequent payments in our setting.
Infrequent payments may in principle also help solve other-control problems. For in-
stance, they may help hide money from other household members or from family and friends.
However, because information on the flexibility option is private, results in DE2 capture
demand for commitment arising from self-control problems. If farmers were solely concerned
about pressure from their family or peers, they could privately pick the flexibility option and
exert it only if the marginal utility from consumption in a given day is particularly high,
in particular higher than the “sharing tax.” Furthermore, the flexibility treatment did not
constrain who delivered milk: the household could still send a family member or worker to
deliver milk (this happens in about 30% of the cases), but instruct the milk clerk to disburse
cash only following a request from the household, not from the milk delivery person. In
addition, the farmers’ motivations to choose monthly payments in the demand experiments
point at a rather limited role for other-control problems as a source of demand for infrequent
payments. At baseline, approximately 30% of farmers report to have been approached by
others for financial help in the previous three months. The timing of these requests is not
correlated with that of coop’s payment. Concerns over workers handling cash do not seem to
be important either: only 1.5% of farmers mention they do not trust the person who would
handle cash in daily payments as a reason to choose monthly payments.
4 Buyers’ Supply of Infrequent Payments
Farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments. The welfare
consequences of such demand depend on whether this commitment device is competitively
supplied or not (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004). Survey evidence shows that, while the
large buyer pays monthly, essentially all the small traders pay daily. There are potentially
many reasons why this happens. For instance, traders might be unable to offer infrequent
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payments if they are also saving constrained. Or farmers may have preferences for infrequent
payments that are specific to the cooperative, e.g., a desire to help the coop by providing
trade credit. We hypothesize that a key reason is that traders cannot supply infrequent
payments due to their limited credibility. This section presents evidence from two lab-in-the-
field experiments we conducted in Summer 2017 to test this hypothesis and distinguish it
from competing explanations. The evidence shows that, under poor contract enforcement,
a trader’s credibility matters for his ability to offer infrequent payments: farmers are not
willing to accept monthly payments from small traders because they are concerned traders
would default on the amount due at the end of the month.
4.1 Supply Experiment 1: Does Buyer Credibility Matter?
The first experimental design is as follows:
Supply Experiment 1 (SE1 ): Farmers sell milk to a trader they know and choose
how to split these sales between daily and monthly payments under two credibility treatments
for the monthly payments. In the “guaranteed” treatment (G), the experimenter guarantees
the monthly payment to the farmer by deducting it from the trader payment and paying the
farmer directly. In the “non-guaranteed” treatment (NG), the trader decides whether to
pay the farmer at the end of the month or default. Daily payments are guaranteed in both
treatments.
To test whether credibility matters, the first experiment varies the credibility of the trader
when offering monthly payments (credibility is not a concern in daily payments). We then
test whether farmers are relatively more willing to sell the same milk to the same trader
under infrequent payments when the trader is more credible. We conduct lab-in-the-field
experiments with farmers and traders that know each other, as described below. It is ob-
viously possible that farmers do not have complete trust in the experimenter, either. This
would make it harder to detect differences between treatments G and NG. To check robust-
ness of our findings to market conditions (and, as we discuss in Section 5.2, to understand
implications for sale responses to price increases), each farmer plays each pair of credibility
treatments at three different price levels for the monthly payments (KSh 40, 50, or 60), while
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keeping the daily price at KSh 40, for a total of six games.13
4.2 Supply Experiment 2: Why Does Buyer Credibility Matter?
Why may farmers not trust traders with monthly payments? A second supply experiment
aims at distinguishing between two explanations. A possibility is that farmers believe that,
in the absence of a payment guarantee mechanism, the trader would simply decide to keep
the money and default at the end of the month. Another possibility is that farmers instead
believe that the trader is also saving constrained and would default simply because he is not
able to hold the due balance until the end of the month.
The second supply experiment tests whether trader’s saving constraints alone matter in
shaping the farmer’s sale decisions:
Supply Experiment 2 (SE2 ): Farmers choose whether to sell to the trader for non-
guaranteed monthly payments or for daily payments under two treatments concerning the
traders’ monthly non-guaranteed payments. In the standard non-guaranteed (NG) treatment,
traders receive their payments daily and are thus potentially saving constrained. In the “no
trader’s saving constraints” non-guaranteed treatment (NGnc), traders receive their payments
for the entire month at the end of the month. The farmer is informed about the trader’s
payment mode before he decides whether to sell for monthly or daily payments.
Therefore, in a seventh game, which otherwise is identical to the game with non-guaranteed
monthly payment at price 50 KSh, the experimenter pays the trader for the entire month at
the end of the month. This ensures the trader would have enough cash to pay the farmer, if
he wished so. The farmer is informed about this. If the farmer believes that traders’ saving
constraints prevent him from paying at the end of the month, monthly sales in this last game
should be larger than in the corresponding non-guaranteed treatment. If, instead, the farmer
is concerned that the trader strategically defaults on due payments, relaxing the trader’s
saving constraint should not affect farmers’ split between daily and monthly payments.
Implementing the Lab-in-the-Field Experiments. We list sixty farmers in four
villages within the catchment area of the cooperative. We ask farmers to list milk traders
13In the supply experiments, monthly prices are (weakly) higher than daily ones. This choice takes into
account that farmers must also trust the experimenters and that the choice is over additional milk, i.e., after
farmers might have already met their demand for monthly payments by selling to the coop.
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they are familiar with and that operate in the same village. We then contact traders and
verify they do know the farmers that listed them. Of the sixty targeted farmers, fifty-five
came to the experimental sessions (all the traders confirmed their availability). Table 1-Panel
B presents summary statistics on the farmers who participated to the supply experiments.
Each farmer plays once each of the seven games in random order. In each game, the
farmer is endowed with three liters of milk per day (approximately equal to the amount
produced by a cow in the afternoon) for thirty days (i.e., 90 liters over thirty days). The
farmer must sell this milk to the trader she is matched with. The farmer decides, once and for
the entire month, how to split her daily endowment of milk between two forms of payments
from the trader: daily and monthly.
Payments occur as it follows. The experimenter pays the trader a “trader price,” which is
constant across games at KSh 60 per liter. The farmer receives a “farmer price” which varies
across games as described above. For all daily payments and for monthly payments in the
guaranteed (G) treatment, the experimenter pays the farmer by deducting the corresponding
amount from the trader payment. For monthly payments in the non-guaranteed treatments
(NG andNGnc), the trader pays the farmer (or defaults). All payments, regardless of whether
they are daily or monthly, occur via mobile money transfer, thereby removing differences in
the mode of payment across payment frequencies. Farmers are paid daily or the end of the
month according to their choices. Traders are paid daily, except in the “no trader’s saving
constraint” (NGnc) treatment, where they are paid at the end of the month. At the end of
the experimental session, one of the seven games is randomly drawn and payment proceeds
according to the outcomes of that game over the course of the ensuing month.
Unlike the demand experiments, which are conducted as field experiments, the supply
experiments are lab-in-the-field experiments. In this controlled environment, we can shock
traders’ credibility (SE1 ) and cash availability for monthly payments (SE2 ) for specific trans-
actions (i.e., “within” farmers). Implementing such a design as a field experiment would be
significantly more challenging, if not altogether impossible.14 Therefore, we pay particular
14First, we would need to vary treatments across traders, not across transactions within farmer-trader pairs.
This would require interacting over a prolonged period of time with a much larger number of itinerant and
unlicensed traders, a task notoriously difficult. Second, it would also require monitoring daily transactions
between traders and farmers (and the form of payments) in an informal setting. Third, it would require
persuading traders to participate and accept a lower amount of money to deduct the farmer’s price in the
treatment G. Finally, the coop, which is also the main partner in our study, did not endorse fieldwork that
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attention in designing lab-in-the-field experiments that closely mimic actual transactions.
First, we play the games with actual farmers and traders that are accustomed to transact
milk under conditions similar to those in the games. Second, we make sure to match farmers
and traders that operate in the same villages and know each other. This guarantees that
the farmer’s choice in the one-shot interaction in the lab captures real-life perceptions about
the credibility of traders she could actually sell to. Third, farmers make high-stake choices,
concerning an endowment of milk that amounts to a sizable portion of their real milk sales.
4.3 Supply Experiments: Results
Trader’s Credibility and Farmer Choices. Figure 4 presents the results. For each
of the seven games, we show: i) the proportion of farmers who sell at least some milk for
monthly payments (Panel A); ii) the average liters sold for monthly payments (Panel B).
Consistent with the field evidence, when monthly payments are not guaranteed, very few
farmers opt for monthly payments. The fraction of farmers selling a positive amount of milk
for monthly sales raises from 0.14 in the non-guaranteed treatments to 0.9 in the guaranteed
ones. Similarly, the average amount sold for monthly payments increases from 0.34 liters
(out of an endowment of three liters) in the non-guaranteed treatments to approximately 2.6
liters when the monthly payment is guaranteed.
Table 2 reports estimates from regressions with farmer fixed effects. Columns (1)-(3) com-
pare guaranteed and non-guaranteed treatments at each price point, while Column (4) reports
results pooling the six games together. The drop in monthly sales in the non-guaranteed
treatment is very large, statistically significant, and holds at different price levels.
Column (6) in Table 2 explores whether traders’ saving constraints drive farmers’ choices.
This is not the case (as confirmed by comparing the fourth and fifth bar in Figure 4). In
the NGnc treatment, paying traders at the end of the month—thus ensuring that they would
have enough money to pay farmers at the end of the month—does not significantly change
farmers’ choices on either the extensive or the intensive margin. The evidence therefore
suggests that, when monthly payments are not guaranteed, farmers are primarily concerned
about the possibility that the traders might strategically default, not about their ability to
hold money.
would de facto match its members to competitor traders risking to further compromise members loyalty.
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Although not the primary goal of the supply experiments, the results also confirm farmers’
strong preference for infrequent payments. Under the guaranteed treatment, farmers over-
whelmingly choose monthly payments. The results hold across a range of prices, including
equal price under daily and monthly payment. The findings of Section 3 thus hold even when
the mode of payment is constant between daily and monthly payments (since both are paid
through mobile money transfer) and when the choice of monthly payments implies departing
from the status quo (since, when the experimental treatments make them credible, the vast
majority of farmers sells for monthly payments to small traders, who usually pay daily).
Discussion. These results show that traders’ credibility affects farmers’ willingness
to accept infrequent payments. This is consistent with the survey evidence described in
Section 2 (see Figure 1- Panel B). Farmers appear to trust traders a lot less than the coop.
While many reasons could account for this difference, we note that the two types of buyers
differ in farmers’ ability to carry out an (informal) punishment strategy in case of payment
default. Traders are mostly small and itinerant buyers and are characterized by relatively
high turnover. Our survey reveals that, even within a village, there is little agreement across
farmers in the number and identity of traders operating in the village. As a result, there is
little community enforcement available to coordinate punishment against delinquent traders:
a trader can default on one farmer and then move to a different village where information
about the default has not spread.
In contrast, the coop is a large and visible institution, buying regularly at fixed premises
(i.e., the collection centers) and with a well-known headquarter. Our survey also shows that
farmers routinely discuss about the coop’s management and affairs.15 Defaulting against even
one farmer could trigger punishment from many farmers and be very costly for the coop.
Taken together, the results from the supply experiments support the hypothesis that,
under poor contract enforcement, the possibility of strategic default severely limits a trader’s
ability to offer monthly payments. In another small-scale experiment, we also verify that,
15In March 2014, the cooperative issued a letter to some farmers to remind them of the statutory provision
according to which members are supposed to sell all milk to the cooperative (Casaburi and Macchiavello,
2015). Although only 45% of the farmers in our sample received the letter, 23% report knowing about it from
other farmers. The average respondent in the survey reports discussing issues related to coop pricing policies
and management with 2.3 other members from the village (significantly higher than interactions about dairy
practices (1.16)). Farmers who had not received the letter were more likely to report having knowledge of it
if i) they report knowing a higher share of other villagers and ii) a higher share of farmers received the letter.
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if given the opportunity, there would be many traders willing to offer monthly payments at
current prices. We play incentivized lab-in-the-field experiments with sixteen of the traders
mentioned by the farmers in the above supply experiments. Traders choose whether they
offer farmers daily or monthly payments and are guaranteed that the farmer will accept the
transaction regardless of their choice. We set the monthly price to be paid to the farmers to
be KSh 5 per liter lower than daily prices, thus lower than the difference in market prices.
Still, a majority of traders (55%) chooses to pay the farmers monthly.
5 Implications of the Saving-Output Interlinkage
The experiments presented so far establish producers’ demand for infrequent payments
and constraints in buyers’ supply of infrequent payments. These results raise several ques-
tions. For instance, how do monthly payments facilitate commitment even if farmers can
sell for daily payments to traders? May the relationship with the buyer further help farm-
ers achieve commitment? And why can’t small traders commit to offer monthly payments
despite interacting with farmers on a repeated basis?
To shed light on these and other questions, we present a model of supply and demand of
infrequent payments. While the model draws from the study setting, it aims at providing a
more general framework to study infrequent payments as commitment devices. The model
also derives implications of the interlinkage between savings and output transactions for
producers’ sale responses to price increases. Section 5.1 presents the model. Section 5.2 tests
the implications of the model with several experimental designs and a calibration exercise.
5.1 A Model of Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments
5.1.1 Setup
Producers. Consider a market with a unitary mass of homogeneous producers. Time
is an infinite sequence of months, m. Each month is divided into three periods, t = 1, 2, 3.
Producers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences across periods, with β < 1 and δ < 1. They
are sophisticated about their time inconsistency. In each of periods t = 1, 2, producers are
endowed with one unit of non-storable output (milk). Producers cannot borrow. They can
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save cash from one period to the next within the same month, earning interest rate (1 + r) =
1/(δ+ǫ), with ǫ→ 0+. In periods t = 1, 2, producers derive utility u(c) = c from consumption
of a perfectly divisible good c (whose price is normalized to one). Following Besley et al.
(1993) and Anderson and Baland (2002), we introduce a demand for an indivisible good that
is purchased and consumed in the last period, t = 3. The indivisible good costs D and gives
utility ∆ > D. We assume producers can afford to buy the indivisible good if they save more
than one period worth of sales. Producer’s utility at the beginning of the month is thus given
by U = c1+βδ(c2+δI∆), where I is an indicator function equal to 1 if the producer purchases
the indivisible good. The assumptions imply that producers always prefer to consume the
divisible good in earlier periods and that they only save to purchase the indivisible good.
Buyers. There are N + 1 buyers, indexed i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N . We refer to buyer 0 as
the large buyer and to buyers i = 1, 2, ..., N , with N ≥ 2, as small buyers. Buyers maximize
discounted profits at common discount factor δ by reselling producers’ output at exogenous
price v. Buyers compete on prices and on whether they pay producers in each period t = 1
and t = 2 (i.e., daily payments) or once at t = 3 (i.e., infrequent payments). If multiple
buyers pay at the same frequency, they compete a` la Bertrand. If two or more buyers buy
for daily payments, Bertrand competition ensures that the daily price per liter is equal to v.
Monthly payments are however subject to contractual hazard: at t = 3, a buyer can
renege on the promised payment. When doing so, he faces a default cost. Buyers differ in
their default costs. Upon reneging on a promise made to a producer for payment at t = 3,
small buyer i can move to an identical outside market. In the outside market the defaulting
buyer is randomly matched with producers who might or might not know about his past
cheating. Let γ ≤ 1 be the per-period probability the defaulting buyer is matched with an
unaware producer in the outside market. In contrast, the large buyer cannot move to the
outside market and, therefore, γL = 0.
For expositional simplicity, we proceed in two steps. First, we understand the demand for
infrequent payments when they are perfectly enforced (i.e., defaults on monthly payments
are not possible) and subject to a buyer zero-profit constraint. As a benchmark, we begin
by considering a liquid saving technology and then allow the large buyer to offer infrequent
payments and show how this helps producers to save. We then allow infrequent payments to
be part of a relational contract with the buyer, who punishes the producer for not delivering
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on a regular basis. We show that this threat further helps producers save. Second, we turn
to the supply of infrequent payments under imperfect contract enforcement. We allow any
buyer to offer monthly payments subject to a credibility constraint (i.e., the buyer must be
given incentives to pay at the end of the month if he has promised to do so). In this scenario,
we derive equilibrium prices for both daily and monthly payments and establish the large
buyer monopsonistic position on infrequent payments as an equilibrium outcome.16
5.1.2 When and Why Do Infrequent Payments Help Save?
A Liquid Saving Technology. As a starting point, consider the case of a producer
who, in a given month, must save on her own using the liquid saving technology. For the
producer to be able to save and buy the indivisible good, two constraints must be met. First,
there is a participation constraint: the producer’s self at t = 1 must be willing to start the
saving plan. Second, there is an incentive constraint: the producer’s self at t = 2 must be
given incentives to complete the saving plan set up by the previous self. Let s1 be the amount
the producer saved in t = 1. At t = 2 the producer completes the plan by saving δD and
purchasing the indivisible good in t = 3 rather than consuming her income and savings if
v − (δD − s1) + βδ∆ ≥ v + s1. Given this constraint, the producer’s self at t = 1 starts
the plan if she is patient enough. These constraints are both met if β is greater than some
threshold β ≥ β1.
Infrequent Payments as Commitment Saving. Consider now the case in which
the producer can sell for infrequent payments that pay at t = 3. When this is the case,
the producer’s self at t = 2 cannot consume the savings passed on by her previous self and,
therefore, is less tempted to abandon the saving plan. The incentive constraint is now given
by v − δ(D − vx1/δ
2) + βδ∆ ≥ v, where x1 is the amount self 1 sells for monthly payments.
Given the now more relaxed incentive constraint, even a relatively less patient producer is
willing to start the plan at t = 1. That is, the indivisible good is purchased if β ≥ β2 with
β2 < β1. This is our first main result: infrequent payments allow to reduce temptations to
over-consume at t = 2 and thus act as a commitment saving product from the perspective of
16Appendix A provides proofs and algebra derivations and discusses a number of extensions to the baseline
model. Considered extensions include, among others, producer heterogeneity, bundling of daily and infrequent
payments, buyers’ objective function and heterogeneity, producer access to credit, personal rules.
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producer’s self at t = 1.
Infrequent Payments with a Relational Buyer. The buyer can further help pro-
ducers save by threatening to punish them if they fail to sell (and thus to save) on a regular
basis. In doing so, the buyer introduces an additional reason to sell for illiquid payments in
the current month: the value of continuing doing so in the future.
The intuition for the result comes again from the incentive constraint at t = 2. Denote
with V ∆ and V 0 the producer’s continuation values when maintaining or leaving the rela-
tionship with the buyer respectively. If the producer sticks to the plan set up with the buyer
she will be able to sell for infrequent payments (and thus save) in the future as well. If,
instead, the producer fails to stick to the plan set up by the buyer, the buyer refuses to
buy from the producer in the future. At t = 2 the producer buys the indivisible good if
v(1 − δ(D/v − x1/δ
2)) + βδ
(
∆+ δV ∆
)
≥ v + βδ (δV 0). If the producer is not able to save
on her own (i.e., β < β2), then the relationship with the buyer provides further disciplines to
producer’s self at t = 2. The incentive constraint is even more relaxed than the one arising
under infrequent payments alone since V ∆ > V 0. There thus exists a threshold β3 < β2 such
that producers with β ∈ [β3, β2) would be able to buy the indivisible good by selling for
infrequent payments to a relational buyer, but not otherwise (in particular, even if they had
access to infrequent payments without the relational contract).
We summarize this discussion with the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. Infrequent payments act as a commitment saving technology: for interme-
diate values of patience β ∈ [β2, β1) the producer is able to save the desired amount with
infrequent payments, but not otherwise. Furthermore, when infrequent payments are part of
a relational contract with the buyer, the producer is able to save also if β ∈ [β3, β2).
5.1.3 Equilibrium Payment Frequency and Pricing under Imperfect Contract
Enforcement
Having understood the demand side of the market, i.e., the value of infrequent payments
in helping producers with self-control problems, we now ask how they are supplied in a
market with imperfect enforcement of such payments. In particular, can a relational contract
like the one described above emerge in a market equilibrium? And would such a contract
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be competitively supplied when infrequent payments must also be self-enforcing? We thus
consider the case in which both the large and the small buyers can offer and default on
monthly payments. We characterize an equilibrium in which the large buyer sets prices such
that small buyers are not able to credibly promise infrequent payments.
The Small Buyers. Consider a small buyer who offers monthly payments to a producer.
The offer is credible if paying the promised amount at the end of the month and continuing
the relationship with the producer gives the small buyer a higher discounted value than
defaulting and then searching for another uninformed producer in the outside market. It can
be shown that this is the case if the purchase price is less than δ3(1− γ)v ≡ pS. Intuitively,
when the share of uninformed producers, γ, is high, it is easier for the small buyer to find a
new supplier and, therefore, the value of the relationship with the current producer is lower.
The Large Buyer. Consider now the large buyer offering monthly payments to the
producers. In setting the price p for infrequent payments, the buyer must take into account
a number of constraints. First, the large buyer must be able to credibly offer infrequent
payments. Recalling that γL = 0, the purchase price under infrequent payments p must be
less than δ3v ≡ pL. Second, the large buyer must prevent competition on infrequent payments
from the small buyers. This can be achieved by setting a price p that prevents small buyers
from credibly offering monthly payments (i.e., the large buyer must offer a price p > pS).
Finally, the buyer must set a purchase price that is high enough to induce producers to enter
the relational contract with infrequent payments, pP . We know from the previous analysis
that the relational contract can be beneficial to producers when p = v. Such a high price,
however, cannot be credibly offered by the large buyer. In equilibrium, the large buyer sets
a “limit price” p∗ that both induces producers to sell for infrequent payments and keep small
traders out of the infrequent payment market. The described equilibrium thus exists if, at
such limit price, the large buyer is credible, i.e., p∗ = max{pP , pS} ≤ pL. Since p∗ < v, there
exists a threshold β4 such that producers with intermediate values of impatience β ∈ [β3, β4)
would sell through infrequent payments if they were competitively supplied under perfect
enforcement but do not when such payments must be self-enforcing. We thus obtain the
following proposition:
Proposition 2. When infrequent payments must be self-enforcing, the following equilibrium
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exists for intermediate values of patience β ∈ (β4, β1): i) the large buyer pays monthly at
price p∗ < v; ii) small buyers pay daily at price v; iii) producers purchase the indivisible good
by selling to the large buyer under a relational contact with monthly payments and consume
out of daily sales to smaller buyers.
Imperfect contract enforcement implies that, in equilibrium, the price for end-of-month
payments, p∗, is lower than the price for daily payments, i.e., p∗ < v. Infrequent payments
are thus offered at negative interest rates, in stark contrast to standard trade credit logic in
which delayed payments are charged positive interest rates.
Imperfect contract enforcement might also induce a barrier to entry in the market for
monthly payments. In equilibrium, the large buyer ensures other buyers cannot credibly offer
monthly payments to producers. Note, however, that under imperfect contract enforcement,
even the large buyer must be credible when offering monthly payments (i.e., p∗ ≤ δ3v ≡ pL <
v). This has implications for the case in which multiple large buyers (i.e., with γ = 0) compete
offering monthly payments. Competition would bid up the price for monthly payments only
up to the maximum price at which these buyers remain credible, pL. Since this is lower than
v, monthly payments would still be provided at negative interest rates, even with competition
among multiple large buyers.
5.1.4 Implications
The proposed equilibrium thus captures both experimental results from the previous
sections: a demand for infrequent payments and their limited supply. The model also sheds
light on how producers would respond to price increases. In particular, the model suggests
that the sale response to an increase in price depends on i) whether the buyer is credible or
not; and ii) whether the price increase is offered only for monthly payments or not. Here, we
informally discuss the logic of these additional implications. In the next section, we present
additional evidence from experiments that exogenously induced buyers to offer large price
increases.
First, consider a buyer who raises the price for monthly payments. This increase would
raise the buyer’s temptation to default and may make him no longer credible. Anticipating
this, the producer may not increase, or actually decrease, her sales. In other words, under
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imperfect contract enforcement, sale responses to price increases would be smaller than for
buyers who can commit to pay at each promised price.
Second, consider the case of the large buyer paying monthly. Consider an unanticipated
and temporary (i.e., for only few days in a month) price increase in monthly payments, which
raises the large buyer’s price above v. The price increase now allows producers to achieve
the desired saving amount with fewer sales. This dampens the sale response (and could, in
principle, even generate a negative sale response). When the large buyer offers the same
price increase with the additional option to pay daily for some of the deliveries, the supply
response, however, will be larger. This is because producers will value the higher price for
daily payments (and consumption) as well, which will induce a larger sale response.17
5.2 Evidence on the Implications: Pricing and Sale Responses
Pricing: Calibration of the Trader Incentive Constraint. Under the pricing
equilibrium of the model, traders should not be able to credibly offer monthly payments
at prevailing market prices. To explore this implication, we present a back-of-the-envelope
calibration of the trader incentive constraint derived in the model. The exercise complements
the results from the supply experiments presented in Section 4.
We slightly modify the trader’s incentive constraint of the previous section to account for
the fact that a month has 30 days. Given market prices pM and pD for monthly and daily
payments respectively, the trader is not able to credibly offer monthly payments if:
pMonthly ≥
1
30
δ(1− γ)
1− δ30
1− δ
pDaily. (1)
The trader cannot commit to monthly payments unless the purchase price for monthly
payments is sufficiently below the price for daily payments. Intuitively, the highest price at
which the trader can commit is increasing in δ (the trader’s discount factor) and in pDaily,
and decreasing in the probability of finding a new farmer to match with after a default, γ.
Armed with this expression, we can ask whether at prevailing market prices, and for
reasonable values of the parameters δ and γ, the trader is indeed able to commit to monthly
17The linear and discrete structure of the model implies extreme responses in which either nothing happens
or the supply response goes to a corner. It is straightforward to extend the model (e.g., introducing producer’s
idiosyncratic preferences for each buyer) and obtain interior responses.
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payments. From the survey, we calibrate pMonthly = 31 and pDaily = 38 (the prevailing prices
in October 2014). For each (annualized) discount factor, δY , we then compute the minimum
level of γ that would prevent traders from credibly committing. The range of considered
discount factors δ spans plausible annual returns to capital for traders, from 5% to 233.33%.
Figure 5 presents the results. A trader defaults if γ is above the frontier described by the
dashed line. Across discount factors, the frontier for γ lies between 0.14 and 0.18. Therefore,
at current market prices, traders would be able to commit to monthly payments only if
information about previous defaults spread quickly across farmers (i.e., if γ were very low).
However, the survey evidence discussed in Section 4.3 suggests low levels of information
sharing about traders, and thus limited opportunities for community punishment.18
Buyer Credibility and Sale Responses: Experimental Evidence. The experi-
mental design for the supply experiments described in Section 4 allows us to test whether
buyer’s credibility affects sale responses to higher prices. Each farmer played the game at
different prices. The monthly payments price varied between KSh 40, 50, and 60 (the daily
payments price was always KSh 40). Column (5) in Table 2 provides support for the model’s
implication. In a regression of sale outcomes (binary or level), the interaction coefficients
between the KSh 50 or KSh 60 price dummies and the non-guaranteed treatment are al-
ways negative (though they are significant at conventional levels only for the KSh 50 price
dummy). This suggests that the sale response in the non-guaranteed monthly payments is
flatter than the one for the guaranteed monthly payments.
Payment Frequency and Sale Responses: Experimental Evidence. An addi-
tional field experiment (“Price and Liquidity Experiment”), conducted in Fall 2014, tests
whether sale responses to price increases depend on payment frequency. The prediction is
relevant for farmers that sell to both the coop and to traders. We therefore focus on a sample
of 398 farmers that regularly sell to the coop in the morning but not in the afternoon, and
thus are likely to sell to traders in the afternoon.19 Farmers were randomly assigned to three
groups: two treatments (150 in each) and one control group (98). In the first treatment,
18Appendix Figure C.2 explores robustness to various monthly prices and to traders’ time-inconsistency.
19Appendix Figure C.3 shows that many farmers sell to the coop (almost) every day of the month and
(almost) never in the afternoon. Three months before running the experiment, we conducted a baseline
survey of 595 such farmers, which we use for the descriptive evidence presented in Figure 1. Appendix Figure
C.4 provides an attempt to measure farmers’ sales to traders.
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farmers were informed that for the subsequent three days they will receive a bonus of KSh
10 per liter (an increase of approximately 30% relative to the baseline price) for afternoon
deliveries. In the second treatment, in addition to the price increase, farmers were given
the option to choose on a daily basis whether, for the deliveries in that day, they wanted to
receive immediate payment or to retain the standard monthly payment. The farmers were
given the opportunity to be paid daily for morning and/or afternoon deliveries for the three
days according to their choice. The randomization was stratified by farmer location (four
zones) and baseline delivery levels.20
Figure 6 summarizes the findings. The bonus treatment (the large price increase) has
a positive but small impact on the afternoon deliveries. As predicted, the bonus+flexibility
group has a larger impact. Table 3 confirms the results. We focus on kilograms delivered
to the coop in the afternoon. Column (1) presents an OLS using only observations from
the three days of the experiment. Column (2) shows results from a difference-in-differences
model. Column (3) reports the estimation of a panel specification, with farmer fixed effects.
The flexibility group displays an increase in afternoon deliveries of 0.24-0.29 kg per day,
compared with a baseline level of zero. While, as hypothesized, the point estimate on this
treatment is larger than the one on the bonus treatment (0.13-0.15 kg), the p-value of the
difference in coefficients is 0.21-0.29, which induces some caution in interpreting the results.21
Several factors could explain a quantitatively small impact. The difficulty in distinguish-
ing sales to traders and own consumption made it difficult to target farmers that could
respond to the intervention, yielding relatively small responses. Consistent with this, Ap-
pendix Table C.4 shows that the impact of the Bonus+Flexibility treatment is stronger for
farmers that could respond: those with higher (morning) delivery level (Column 1), those less
loyal to the coop (Column 2), and those with access to another trader (Column 3). Over-
all, while acknowledging the low precision of the estimates, the results provide suggestive
evidence that the sale response to price increases depends on the frequency of payments.
20Appendix Table C.3 suggests that the randomization worked overall. The proportion of male respondents
differs across the two treatment groups (p-value=0.052) and the proportion of farmers reporting access to
traders differs across the flexibility and the control group (p-value=0.079). Around 6% of the treatment
farmers could not be reached before the intervention (comparable across treatment groups).
21A binary indicator equal to one if the farmer sold any afternoon milk delivers similar results (Columns
(4)-(6)). Columns (7)-(9) show results for morning deliveries. As expected, the point estimate for the bonus
treatment is negative though, again, large standard errors prevent us from drawing any conclusion.
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6 Conclusion
The paper has provided experimental evidence on demand and supply of infrequent pay-
ments as a commitment device. Farmers are willing to incur a sizable cost to receive monthly
payments and demand for commitment is an important driver of this preference. Due to
imperfect contract enforcement, infrequent payments pay negative interest rates and might
not be competitively supplied, thus raising the cost of accessing commitment for farmers.
A theoretical model shows how supply and demand for infrequent payments interact in a
market setting. The model also delivers additional predictions on pricing and sale responses
to price increases in such a market, which we then test.
The Interlinkage in Other Markets. While this study is based on a specific setting,
we conjecture its findings might be relevant for a broad class of markets featuring saving-
constrained producers. In this final section, we discuss evidence from other settings. While
the discussion is surely not sufficient to establish the relevance of the proposed mechanisms
in other contexts, it nevertheless provides suggestive evidence that could motivate further
research. First, evidence from other parts of the Kenyan dairy sector supports our results and
interpretation. Studying dairy farmers in Nandi county, Geng et al. (2017) shows that farmers
sell to buyers paying at different frequencies to balance saving and cash needs. In another
location in Rift Valley, Kramer and Kunst (2017) replicates our first demand experiment,
finding very similar results. In addition, 66% of dairy farmers report selling to the local
cooperative because it can be trusted to save money for later, even if the coop pays a lower
price than other buyers. These findings are also confirmed in focus groups with dairy farmers
in several areas of Central Kenya (Morton et al., 2000).22
Beyond the Kenyan dairy sector, Figure 7-Panel A presents survey evidence on producers’
demand for infrequent payments in another agricultural value chain (the Kenyan tea sector)
and in a labor market setting (workers in large garments factories in Myanmar). In both
cases, the graph reports patterns remarkably consistent with those among our dairy farmers.
In many agricultural value chains, large buyers source through infrequent payments. An
example is provided by smallholder tea contract farmers, who pick leaves and sell them
22In many of these contexts, the large buyers pay at the end of the month a price lower than the price smaller
traders pay daily. However, this is not true everywhere (Jack et al., 2016; Geng et al., 2017). Obviously,
other differences across buyers can shape the specific price gap in each setting.
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multiple days per month (10-20 days depending on the timing of the season). In a survey of
a random sample of 100 such farmers in Western Kenya, 81% mention monthly payments as
their preferred payment frequency and 95% say monthly payments help save.
In many labor markets, infrequent wage payments from the employer may serve a simi-
lar commitment purpose than infrequent payments from buyers do in goods markets. The
historical shift toward (semi-)monthly payments may have fostered durable purchase in the
“middle class” of salaried workers (Banerjee and Duflo, 2008; Gollin, 2002). In a survey of 34
Myanmar garment factory workers (specifically, line supervisors), all the respondents men-
tion monthly payments as their preferred payment frequency and 84% state that monthly
payments help reach saving goals. Monthly payments may be particularly valuable in settings
where important expenses (e.g., rent, bills) come on a monthly basis. Clark (1994) argued
that the monitoring associated with the factory system helped workers deal with self-control
in effort provision (Kaur et al., 2015 provides experimental evidence). Our results suggest
that it can also help with self-control in saving and spending habits. Finally, a variety of
labor markets institutions emerged to help workers save, e.g., in anticipation of high expenses
during festivities. These include Employee Christmas Clubs, which are common in the United
States, Eid Bonuses paid by government and large firms in Bangladesh ahead of Eid al-Fitr,
and Thirteenth Salaries, which employers pay to workers in December in many countries
around the world.
Our analysis also suggests that larger firms might be in a better position to offer infrequent
payments credibly. In the tea setting, the survey shows that large buyers (cooperatives and
large estates) pay monthly but smaller traders predominantly (68%) pay daily. Figure 7-
Panel B provides further suggestive evidence. In a survey of 198 coffee mills in Rwanda,
the graph documents a strong correlation between firm size and the likelihood the firm pays
its (seasonal) workers on a monthly basis: 71% of the firms in the top quartile of the size
distribution pay monthly but only 30% of the firms in the bottom quartile do.
To summarize, the mechanisms described in this paper may apply to several markets
that feature saving-constrained producers (or workers). While we are aware the evidence
in this section is just a first step that could be accounted for by different mechanisms, we
nevertheless hope it will provide motivation for future research.
Policy Implications. Our analysis leads to a number of policy relevant considerations.
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First, producers’ demand for infrequent payments suggest that these are an effective and
natural commitment saving device, which is common in the real world. Policies promoting
infrequent payments (for instance in labor contracts or cash transfers) may thus foster invest-
ment and purchase of durable goods. More work is needed to understand how to optimally
structure payments to both help fund lumpy expenses and ensure consumption smoothing.
In addition, while infrequent payments may naturally target sophisticated individuals,
attracting naive producers would require paying higher prices, as naive individuals do not
recognize the commitment value of infrequent payments. There is no guarantee the market
will extend infrequent payments to all those who need them.23 Consistent with this obser-
vation, a survey from a random sample of farmers in our study setting shows that farmers
who do not regularly sell to the coop are less likely to achieve saving goals (Appendix Table
C.2). Exploring the sorting of producers and workers with varying degrees of sophistication
across different organizational forms is a further avenue for future research.
Second, our results emphasize the role of poor contract enforcement as a barrier to com-
petition in the provision of infrequent payments. By increasing the number of buyers who
can credibly commit to infrequent payments, better enforcement may have an impact similar
to improving the terms of saving products (e.g., increasing the interest). This logic thus
unveils a novel benefit of improving contract enforcement in goods and labor markets.
23See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) for a theoretical analysis of compe-
tition, sophistication and welfare, including the possibility that naive types end up with exploitative contracts.
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Figures
Figure 1: Descriptive Evidence: Farmers, Traders, and Infrequent Payments
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Panel A: Farmer Savings and the Coop
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Panel B: Traders and Low Frequency Payments
Notes: The figures presents descriptive statistics from the baseline survey (N=596). Panel A presents sum-
mary statistics on farmer savings behavior and on the role of the coop in helping savings. All the variables
are binary indicators and the horizontal bars display the frequency of farmers agreeing with the statement
in the baseline survey. For the first variable, “Set saving goals”, we use the entire baseline sample. For the
other variables, we restrict the sample to those farmers who state they set saving goals. “Would reach goals
less if coop paid weekly” takes value one if a farmer answers “less often than I do currently” to the question
“If the coop paid every week, how often would you reach your saving goals?” Panel B presents summary
statistics on farmer attitudes toward traders other than the coop. The binary indicators “Trusts coops more
than traders” and “Coop more reliable than traders in payments” are equal to one if the trust score or the
payment reliability score are strictly larger for the coop than for other buyers, respectively. In the survey,
the variable Trust for either the coop and the buyer is measured on an index from 1 to 4 and the average
difference between the two is 0.853.
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Figure 2: Demand Experiments: Farmers’ Demand for Infrequent Payments
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Notes: The figure presents results from the demand experiments described in Section 3. The left bar focuses
on the first demand experiment (DE1 ). It reports the share of farmers who choose monthly payments over
daily payments with a bonus of KSh 5 (from a baseline of KSh 31). The right bar focuses on the second
demand experiment (DE2 ). It reports the share of farmers who chose monthly payments over the “flexibility”
option, which would allow them to choose every day whether to be paid daily or monthly.
Figure 3: Demand Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
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Notes: The figure presents results from the demand lab-in-the-field experiment described in Section 3.3
(Distribution of Demand for Infrequent Payments). This lab-in-the-field experiment followed a within-subject
design: farmers decided whether to sell three liters of milk for monthly or daily payments at various prices
per liter for the daily payment option. The y-axis reports the share of farmers who prefer the end-of-month
payment at five price points. The vertical line represents the (constant) price per liter under the monthly
payment.
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Figure 4: Supply Experiments: Trader Credibility and Monthly Sales
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Notes: The figure presents the results from the supply experiments described in Section 4. Farmers played
seven games in which they had to choose once and for all how much to sell for monthly vs. daily payments.
In each game farmers were endowed with three liters per day for the duration of a month (i.e., 90 liters).
Farmers played the games in random order. The price per liter for daily payments was close to prevailing
market prices at the time of the experiment and fixed at KSh 40 per liter. The price of monthly payments
varied across games: KSh 40, 50, 60. Section 4 describes the three treatments concerning monthly payments:
guaranteed (G), non-guaranteed (NG) and non-guaranteed with monthly payment to the trader (NGnc). The
NGnc treatment was played only with the monthly price at KSh 50 per liter. For each of the seven games,
Panel A reports the proportion of farmers who sell a positive amount of milk for monthly payments and
Panel B reports the average amount of daily liters sold for monthly payments out of the experimentally
provided endowment.
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Figure 5: Trader’s Incentive Constraint Calibration
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Notes: The figure shows pairs (δY , γ) that satisfy the inequality of the trader incentive constraint of the
empirical model (Equation 1)—where δY is the annual discount factor and γ is the likelihood a trader
matches with an uninformed farmer after a default. Monthly price pM and daily price pD are calibrated
based on prevailing market prices at KSh 31 and 38, respectively. A trader defaults if γ is above the frontier
described by the dashed line in the figure. The figure shows that unless farmers are implausibly well-informed
about traders default, traders would not be able to commit to monthly payments. The result holds for a
range of discount factors that imply annual interest rates spanning the plausible range of annual returns to
capital to traders (from 5% to 233.33% in the figure). Appendix Figure C.2 shows robustness when varying
monthly prices or allowing for trader time inconsistency.
Figure 6: Price and Liquidity Experiment
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Notes: The figure presents the results of the Price and Flexibility randomized experiment described in Section
5.2. The experiment targeted farmers selling to the coop in the morning but not in the afternoon at baseline.
Farmers in the Bonus group received an increase in milk price of 10 Kenyan shillings for afternoon deliveries.
Farmers in the Bonus+Flexibility group received the same price increase and the option to choose each day
whether to be paid daily or at the end of the month. The y-axis reports average afternoon deliveries for the
two treatment groups and the control group. Days 1 to 3 refer to the days of the experiment. Days -3 to -1
refer to the same calendar days of the month before the experiment.
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Figure 7: Survey Evidence from Other Settings
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Notes: Panel A reports percentage of respondents agreeing with the four statements in three different
surveys: dairy farmers in Kiambu, Central Kenya (left bar); tea growers in Kericho, Western Kenya (center
bar); and line supervisors in garments factories in Yangon, Myanmar (right bar). The question ”Do Monthly
Payments Help Bank Saving” was not asked to dairy farmers in Kiambu. Panel B reports the percentage of
coffee mills in Rwanda paying monthly wages (as opposed to biweekly, weekly and daily wages) to seasonal
employees during the 2015 harvest season. The figure shows larger mills pay less frequently. We thank Ameet
Morjaria for sharing the data from Rwanda.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Demand and Supply Experiments
Panel A: Panel B:
Demand Experiments Supply Experiments
(N=191) (N=55)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Male respondent 0.411 0.493 0.404 0.496
Respondent age 55.319 14.582 51.106 12.497
Household size 4.639 2.013 4.085 1.73
Number of cows 1.88 1.129 2.109 1.449
Daily milk production (lt.) 16.88 14.36 16.65 13.71
Sets saving goals 0.869 0.338 1 0
Saves in saving groups 0.652 0.478 0.638 0.486
Saves in bank 0.757 0.43 0.851 0.36
Hires workers for dairy 0.403 0.492 0.638 0.486
Knows any other village buyer 0.8 0.401 1 0
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the farmers targeted in the demand experiments pre-
sented in Section 3 and in the supply experiments presented in Section 4. In Panel B, the mean of “knows
any other village buyer” is equal to 1 by construction, since we only targeted farmers who did business with
at least another buyer in the village.
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Table 2: Supply Experiments
Monthly Price (KSh)= 40 50 60 40, 50, 60 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Any Monthly Sale (dummy)
Non-Guaranteed -0.691∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗∗ -0.745∗∗∗ -0.764∗∗∗ -0.691∗∗∗ -0.855∗∗∗
[0.063] [0.048] [0.059] [0.030] [0.052] [0.046]
Price=50 0.027 0.109∗∗
[0.037] [0.052]
Price=50 *Non Guaranteed -0.164∗∗
[0.074]
Price=60 0.064∗ 0.091∗
[0.037] [0.052]
Price=60 *Non Guaranteed -0.055
[0.074]
Monthly Payment to Trader 0.036
[0.046]
Mean Y Baseline Group 0.836 0.945 0.927 0.903 0.903 0.145
Observations 110 110 110 330 330 165
Panel B: Monthly Sales (liters)
Non-Guaranteed -2.045∗∗∗ -2.464∗∗∗ -2.273∗∗∗ -2.261∗∗∗ -2.045∗∗∗ -2.464∗∗∗
[0.186] [0.143] [0.173] [0.089] [0.154] [0.131]
Price=50 0.118 0.327∗∗
[0.109] [0.154]
Price=50 *Non Guaranteed -0.418∗
[0.218]
Price=60 0.241∗∗ 0.355∗∗
[0.109] [0.154]
Price=60 *Non Guaranteed -0.227
[0.218]
Monthly Payment to Trader 0.055
[0.131]
Mean Y Baseline Group 2.391 2.718 2.745 2.618 2.618 0.345
Observations 110 110 110 330 330 165
Notes: The table presents the results from the supply experiments presented in Section 4. Farmers played
seven games in which they had to choose, once and for all, how much to sell on monthly vs. daily payments,
out of an endowment of three liters per day for the duration of a month (90 liters). Farmers played the games
in random order. The price per liter for daily payments was close to prevailing market prices at the time of the
experiment and fixed at KSh 40 per liter. The price of monthly payments varied across games: KSh 40, 50,
60. Section 4 describes the three treatments concerning monthly payments: guaranteed (G), non-guaranteed
(NG) and non-guaranteed with monthly payment to the trader (NGnc). The dependent variable in Panel
A is a dummy equal to one if a farmer sells a positive amount of milk for monthly payments and in Panel
B is the amount of liters the farmer sells for monthly payments (out of a daily endowment of three liters).
Columns (1), (2), and (3) report results for Supply Experiment 1, when the monthly price is equal to KSh
40, 50, and 60, respectively. Column (4) pools the previous samples. Column (5) shows heterogeneity in the
impact of price increases by guaranteed treatment (see discussion in Section 5.2). Column (6) presents the
results of Supply Experiment 2, comparing monthly sales among the G, NG and NGnc treatments (at KSh
50 for monthly payments). All specifications include farmer fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by
farmer. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table 3: Price and Liquidity Experiment
Kg PM Kg PM (dummy) Kg AM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Post*Bonus (γ) 0.128∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.223 -0.223
(0.050) (0.050) (0.015) (0.015) (0.283) (0.283)
Post*(Bonus+Flexibility) (δ) 0.245∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.009
(0.098) (0.098) (0.020) (0.020) (0.316) (0.316)
Post -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.004 -0.108 -0.218
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004) (0.205) (0.211)
Bonus 0.153∗∗ -0.000 0.047∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.319 -0.336
(0.062) (.) (0.017) (0.000) (0.259) (0.304)
Bonus+Flexibility 0.286∗∗∗ 0.029 0.074∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.281 -0.420
(0.105) (0.029) (0.022) (0.007) (0.293) (0.302)
R2 0.186 0.028 0.038 0.252 0.038 0.054 0.506 0.008 0.011
p-value γ = δ 0.211 0.287 0.286 0.235 0.315 0.315 0.886 0.496 0.496
Control Group Mean (Post Period) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4.110 4.110 4.110
Farmer FE X X X
Farmers 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398 398
Observations 1194 2388 2388 1194 2388 2388 1194 2388 2388
Notes: The table presents the results of the Price and Flexibility randomized experiment described in
Section 5.2. The experiment targeted farmers selling to the coop in the morning but not in the afternoon at
baseline. Farmers in the Bonus group received an increase in milk price of 10 Kenyan shillings for afternoon
deliveries. Farmers in the Bonus+Flexibility group received the same price increase and the option to be paid
daily. The table reports three measures of daily deliveries: kilograms delivered in the afternoon; a dummy for
whether the farmer delivers any milk in the afternoon; kilograms delivered in the morning. For each farmer,
the regression includes a maximum of six observations. Three observations come from the experiment days
(Post = 1) and three from the same calendar days in the previous month (Post = 0). For each outcome,
the first model (Columns (1), (4), (7)) is an OLS run only on the three Post observations, controlling for
the average level of the outcome in the three baseline observations. The second model (Columns (2), (5),
(8)) is a difference-in-differences. The third model (Columns (3), (6), (9)) adds farmer fixed effects to the
difference-in-differences. In Columns (1), (4), and (7), the row “p-value γ = δ” reports the p-value from
testing equality of the coefficients on Bonus and Bonus+Flexibility. In the other columns, the row “p-value
γ = δ” reports the p-value from testing equality of the coefficients Post*Bonus and Post*(Bonus+Flexibility).
Standard errors are clustered at the farmer level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Appendix
A Theory Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
To avoid a lengthy taxonomy of cases, the analysis focuses on interior solutions. This is without loss of
generality as there always exists a rescaling of parameters D and ∆ such that all assumptions are verified
and an interior solution exists. We consider the three scenarios described in the main text. For notational
simplicity, we also assume buyers pay a per period interest rate of 1/δ when paying at the end of the month.
This eliminates a trade credit motive and delivers a more transparent algebra without affecting any of the
results.
A Liquid Saving Technology: Consider the case of a producer who, in a given month, must save on her
own using the liquid saving technology. In t = 2, the producer decides to save δD and purchase the indivisible
good in t = 3, rather than consuming, if v + s1 − δD + βδ∆ ≥ v + s1, where s1 is the amount the producer
saved in t = 1. The inequality holds if β ≥ D∆ ≡ β1. In addition, since v/δ < D, self 1 must also save
sP1 = δ
2(D − v/δ). She chooses to do so if v − sP1 + βδ
2∆ ≥ v(1 + βδ), or β ≥ D∆ −
v
δ∆ ≡ β˜ < β1.
Infrequent Payments: Consider now the case in which the buyer pays a price per liter p at the end of the
month (t = 3). Self 2 will save s∗2 = δ(D− px1/δ) for the indivisible good if v − ((D− px1)/δ) + βδ∆ > v or
x1 ≥
δ2(D−β∆)
p
≡ x∗1. In turn, self 1 will be willing to provide this minimum amount of illiquid savings to self
2 if (1− x∗1)v + βδ((v − s
∗
2) + δ∆) ≥ (1 + βδ)v, which holds if p ≥ v
D−β∆
β∆(1−β) ≡ p2. The infrequent payment
helps if the buyer can make non-negative profits, i.e., p ≤ v. Setting p = v yields β ≥ 1 −
√
∆−D
∆ ≡ β2.
Simple algebra shows that β2 < β1. When β ∈ [β2, β1) producers can buy the indivisible good if the large
buyer provides infrequent payments but not by saving on their own. Note that the threshold β2 corresponds
to the case in which producers sell at v and save in a commitment saving account with large withdraw fees
before t = 3.
Infrequent Payments with a Relational Buyer: As discussed in the paper, a buyer who offers infrequent
payments can further help producers save by threatening to punish them if they fail to sell (and thus to
save) on a regular basis. We focus on the stationary relational contract that maximizes the buyer profits
subject to incentive constraints for the producer. In the resulting relational contract the large buyer sets a
price p for deliveries and requires the producer to sell x1 and x2 in period 1 and 2 respectively, such that
p(x1/δ
2 + x2/δ) = D. If the producer ever deviates, the large buyer will never accept deliveries from that
producer in the future.
Self 2 sells to the large buyer if v(1 − x∗∗2 ) + βδ
(
∆+ δV ∆
)
≥ v + βδ
(
δV 0
)
, where x∗∗2 = δ(
D
p
− x1
δ2
),
V ∆ = (1−x1)v+δ(1−x2)v+δ
2∆
1−δ3 and V
0 = 1+δ1−δ3 v are the continuation values when maintaining or leaving the
relation, respectively. The inequality holds if x1 ≥ δ
2Dv(1−(1−β)δ
3)−pβ∆
pv(1−δ3) ≡ x
∗∗
1 . Thus, x
∗∗
1 is the minimum
level of (infrequent payment) sales that self 1 must make to the large buyer to induce self 2 to sell to the
large buyer, too. Self 1 will chose to sell this amount if p ≥ Dv 1+(1−β)
2δ3
(2−β)β∆ ≡ p3.
Under the assumption of perfect contract enforcement and no buyer default, the relational contract helps
producers buy the indivisible good as long as the large buyer can make zero profit from the relationship, i.e., if
p ≤ v. Setting p = v and rearranging terms yields β ≥ 1−
√
∆−D
∆−Dδ3 ≡ β3. Simple algebra establishes β3 < β2.
When β ∈ [β3, β2), the producer buys the indivisible good under the relational contract (which features both
illiquid payment and punishment threat), but not with illiquid payments alone. Even a producer with access
to an illiquid saving technology might not use it if the buyer provides illiquid payments with the additional
threat of future punishment if the producer deviates from the plan.
Proof of Proposition 2. We now consider the case in which infrequent payments must be self-enforcing,
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i.e., buyers must be given incentives to honor their promises to pay at the end of the month. While, in
principle, both the large and the small buyers can offer infrequent payments, we characterize an equilibrium
in which the large buyer sets prices such that small buyers are not able to credibly promise infrequent
payments. That is, we construct an equilibrium such as the one described in Proposition 3. We first check
that in equilibrium there are no profitable unilateral deviations and then show that there are intermediate
values of β that satisfy all the conditions.
Proposed Equilibrium: In the proposed equilibrium the large buyer first sets the price for infrequent
payments.24 The small traders decide whether to offer daily or infrequent payments and at which price.
Finally producers either accept or reject the relational contract offered by the large buyer and make their
sales and purchases decisions.
Large Buyer: The large buyer sets the price to maximize profits subject to three constraints: i) producers
must be willing to sell; ii) no other trader can credibly offer infrequent payments; and iii) the large buyer
must be credible. Generally, when such an equilibrium exists iii) cannot be binding.
Let us now consider the large buyer’s possible deviations. Two cases must be distinguished: case 1:)
the producer’s participation constraint is binding; case 2:) the small traders’ incentive constraint binds. In
both cases the large buyer has no incentive to default on promised monthly payments, as she would lose the
future rents. In both cases she also has no incentives to lower the price. If the producer’s participation is
binding that would lower the volumes bought; if the small trader’s incentive constraint is binding traders
would then become credible at a larger price and the buyer wouldn’t make any profit. The large buyer has
thus no incentives to deviate.
Producers: In case 1 producers do not have incentives to deviate: they are indifferent between sticking
to the plan versus deviating and never being able to buy the indivisible good in the future. In case 2 they
would be made strictly worse-off by such a deviation.
Small Traders: Small traders also have no incentives to deviate. In the proposed equilibrium they make
zero profits. Given the price set by the large buyer they can’t credibly offer infrequent payments. If they do
so, they would still make zero profit.25
We have thus checked that the proposed strategy profile constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
in which no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate. We now check that all the required conditions can
indeed be verified for intermediate values of impatience β.
Existence: Consider a deviation in which a small buyer offers a producer infrequent payments at price p
and denote with xˆSt the resulting quantity the trader buys in period t = 1, 2. If the producer accepts the small
buyer’s offer, she is punished by the large buyer who will refuse to purchase from her in the future. To attract
the producer, then, the small buyer must offer a deal that allows the producer to purchase the indivisible good
solely from his promised low frequency payment. The deviating small buyer faces the maximum temptation
in t = 3, once he has already purchased the output and needs to pay for deliveries xˆS1 and xˆ
S
2 . Let’s consider
a one-period deviation where the small buyer defaults for one month and then reverts to pay future sales with
24To be precise, at the beginning of the game the large buyer posts a plan, i.e., a sequence of prices and
buying policies for all future periods on- and off- the equilibrium path. As is well-known, in the optimal
stationary equilibrium of this game the two formulations are equivalent (Abreu, 1988) and we therefore avoid
the unnecessary notational complexity associated with the plan.
25The assumption that buyers either offer monthly or daily payments, but not both, rules out a deviation
in which small traders offer a contingent plan in which monthly payments are offered only to those producers
that have defaulted on the large buyer. If they could do so (or if we consider asymmetric equilibria in which
some small traders specialize in offering infrequent payments to defaulting producers) we need to distinguish
the two cases. In case 1 the producer wouldn’t accept the offer: the producer constraint is binding at
a monthly price that is larger than what traders could credibly offer. In case 2, instead, the defaulting
producer would accept the deal. This contingent plan would thus change the value of defaulting on the
large buyer for the producer. This would shrink the set of parameters for which a case 2 equilibrium arises,
without altering any of the other conclusions.
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infrequent payments upon meeting in the outside market a producer willing to sell to him (which happens in
each period with probability γ).26
The continuation value of such a relationship with a producer is given by V S =
∑
∞
s=0 δ
3s(v−p)(xˆS1 +δxˆ
S
2 ).
The small buyer’s offer is credible if paying the promised amount and continuing the relationship gives
a higher discounted value than defaulting and then searching for an uninformed producer in the outside
market, that is: − p
δ2
(xˆS1 + δxˆ
S
2 )+ δV
S ≥ δ
∑
∞
m=0 γ(1−γ)
mδ3mV S . Simple algebra delivers: p ≤ δ3(1−γ)v ≡
pS . The empirical version of the trader IC constraint used in the calibration (Equation 1) is similarly
derived. We consider a buyer who sources a constant amount of milk, x, and pays the same unit price, p,
across the 30 days of the month (these assumptions are supported by the data). The incentive constraint
is −30px + δ
∑
∞
s=0 δ
30s((
∑29
t=0 δ
tvx) − 30δ29px) ≤ δ
∑
∞
u=0 δ
30u(1 − γ)u
∑
∞
s=0 γδ
30s((
∑29
t=0 δ
tvx) − 30δ29px),
which simplifies to p > 130δ(1− γ)
1−δ30
1−δ v ≡ p
T
empirical.
The large buyer sets the price to maximize profits subject to three constraints. First, he must pay a
price higher than the highest price at which small buyers can credibly promise infrequent payments, p ≥ pS .
Second, he must pay a price high enough to induce producers to sell for infrequent payments. This minimum
price, which we denote as pP , is equal to p3 defined in the proof of Proposition 1. At this price, the
large buyer must be credible, which is the case if pP ≤ δ3v. Simple algebra shows that this is the case if
β ≥ 1−
√
∆− D
δ3
∆−D ≡ β4 > β3. There always exists a set of parameters such that β4 < β1, and thus the producer
can save through a relational contract with infrequent payments (and imperfect enforcement), but not on her
own. The large buyer then sets p∗ = max
{
pS , pP
}
.
A.2 Extensions
(No) Bundling of Monthly and Cash Payments. So far we have assumed that the large buyer
does not offer daily payments. Could the large buyer possibly profit from offering daily payments as well?
To begin with, note that free entry implies that buyers make zero profits on daily payments. This implies
that the only way the large buyer could profit from offering daily payments is through a bundling contract
in which monthly payments are offered only to those producers that supply all their production in both
periods. Three considerations suggest that such bundling might not be profitable. First, if the producer’s
participation constraint is already binding bundling would not increase profits. If producers are heterogeneous
but discrimination is not possible, bundling might even decrease profits. Second, to offer daily payments, the
large buyer might have to incur higher costs. For example, it would have to monitor milk collectors to handle
cash properly. These higher costs do not bring profits in the daily payment market, and might reduce profits
making the large buyer less credible in offering the monthly payments. Finally, by offering daily payments
the large buyer could make it harder for the producer to sustain the commitment plan, thereby undoing its
main source of profits.
Producer’s Utility and Heterogeneity. The model assumes that producers have a linear utility
function. Allowing a concave utility function and/or that producers also derive utility from consumption of
the divisible good in t = 3 would make algebra more cumbersome without providing additional insights or
altering the key results.
26In the model, default on one farmer triggers punishment from farmers the trader tries to match in
subsequent periods, but not from other farmers the buyer is currently buying from. Allowing for this collective
punishment would imply that the optimal deviation for the trader would be defaulting on all the farmers he
buys from. If the opportunity to find new uninformed farmers, γ, is invariant with size, the trader incentive
constraint when allowing for collective punishment would be identical to our baseline framework. However,
γ may be decreasing in the number of farmers the buyer deals with. In practice, most traders are small
itinerant buyers with limited capacity. We therefore abstract from differences in size across traders and focus
on the difference between the traders and the large credible buyer. The model generalizes to the case with
heterogeneous costs of default: γ0 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ2 < ... < γN .
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Similarly, it is also straightforward to extend the model to allow for producers heterogeneity in, e.g., the
degree of time-inconsistency β or the valuation for the indivisible good ∆. Consider for instance the case in
which ∆i differs across producers and is distributed according to a strictly increasing and twice continuously
differentiable cumulative function G(∆i) on support ∆i ∈ [0,∞). In this case the key result of the theory
that the price paid by buyers offering monthly payments is lower than the daily price would still emerge
in equilibrium. In addition, there would be a sorting of producers with heterogeneous ∆i into different
marketing channels.27
Payment Frequencies. The model focuses on the case in which there are only two payment frequencies:
daily and monthly. This is in line with evidence from our context suggesting that the vast majority of
traders do not offer any delayed payment, even at weekly frequencies. A natural question is why traders in
practice do not offer delayed payments with shorter – e.g., weekly, or bi-weekly – frequencies. This would
reduce the amount they promised to pay to producer and give them more credibility. While we do not
have conclusive evidence on this, we conjecture the following as a plausible explanation. Time-inconsistent
producers might not be able to carry forward intermediate amounts of money resulting from, e.g., weekly
sales to buy indivisible goods at the end of the month. That is, producers would only be able to buy smaller
indivisible goods, for which they might not have a demand. This lack of demand could be in itself the result
of producers’ adaptation to the equilibrium with only monthly payments from the coop.
Access to Credit. While the model emphasizes the role of saving constraints, it also makes the stark
assumption that producers cannot borrow. The logic of the model survives the introduction of an informal
credit market in which producers borrow from lenders (including buyers). The reason is as follows. In the
presence of limited contract enforcement, an informal credit market will develop only if the producer can
commit to repay the informal lender. It can be shown that there are parameters configurations such that a
producer isn’t able to credibly borrow to purchase the lumpy good, but can stick to a saving plan that allows
him to (and vice versa).
When the producer can both credibly borrow in the informal market as well as stick to a saving plan, her
welfare under the two scenarios depends on two opposing forces: competition vs. over-borrowing. Buyers do
not face credibility issues when extending loans. If multiple buyers can offer loans, competition pushes prices
up. On the other hand, time-inconsistent producers might end up borrowing for lumpy goods their future
selves regret if intra-personal rules are not powerful enough. So, even when an informal borrowing market is
available, producers might prefer the discipline provided by saving through the large buyer.
Furthermore, the presence of large buyers offering a saving tool undermines producers’ credibility when
borrowing from traders: in the event of a default against a trader, the producer can still buy desired lumpy
goods in the future by selling to the large buyer. By offering this saving service, the large buyer prevents
competition from traders offering credit without having to take on any default risk. In our context, producers
have limited access to well-functioning formal credit markets, but they could borrow from either the large
buyer, traders, or other informal sources to finance their lumpy consumption. Evidence from the survey
reveals however that only 26% of producers borrow from any source for their dairy business; and very few
borrow from either traders or the coop.
Intra-Personal Plans. In the main text, we abstracted from producers’ personal strategies across
periods (see, e.g., Strotz, 1955; Laibson, 1997; Bernheim et al., 2015). These strategies could allow the
producer to save the necessary amount to buy the indivisible good. The intuition is as follows. Consider a
producer that decides to follow a plan in which she saves sufficient funds to purchase the indivisible good on
27These insights are robust to the case in which the large buyer can perfectly discriminate across producers.
With multiple large buyers competing perfect discrimination would of course not be possible. In practice,
the cooperative bylaws rule out price discrimination possibly due to prevailing norms and the concern that
producers could perceive to be treated unfairly. We have also assumed that all buyers maximize profits. The
framework can be extended to the case in which the large buyer (which is a coop) also cares about producers’
welfare. Provided the assumption of limited contract enforcement is maintained the main results wouldn’t
change.
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her own. Should any of her selves ever deviate, all future selves consume all their endowment every period
and the indivisible good is never purchased again. By relaxing the incentive constraint, infrequent payments
would still help.
In our simple model with perfect monitoring the intra-personal rule perfectly mimics the relational
contract with the buyer: if the producer can punish herself by committing to never buy the indivisible
again she will achieve the same level of deterrence afforded by the relational contract with the buyer. In
practice (and in more complicated models) we conjecture that the relational contract with the buyer could
still help achieving saving targets even those producers that can implement inter-temporal saving strategies.
For example, the producer might find it difficult to carry out the punishment because her future selves have
a strong temptation to renegotiate. Such renegotiations might not be easily prevented since the producer
also has strong incentive to forget what caused deviating from the plan in the past, as in Be´nabou and Tirole
(2004). The buyer has no incentive to renegotiate the punishment as such a renegotiation could lead other
producers to reduce supplies and would have incentives to remind the producers about her past deviations.
This would give the buyer a stronger ability to punish producers’ deviating selves.
B Survey Evidence
B.1 Survey Evidence on Farmers’ Demand for Infrequent Pay-
ments
The demand experiment results are consistent with, and further supported, by several additional pieces
of survey evidence. First, as discussed in Section 3.3, Figure 1-Panel A shows that many farmers report they
want the coop to may monthly and that monthly payments help save.
Second, Appendix Table C.1 suggests that having another regular occupation or being a larger producers
is associated with a lower likelihood that the farmer states that the coop helps reaching the saving goals
(Columns 3 and 4). In the same table, the role of the payment frequency in achieving the saving goals is
particularly large for present-biased farmers, consistent with a certain degree of sophistication in our target
population.
Third, correlation patterns from a very short survey administered to a representative sample of the
overall farmers population in the area (i.e., including farmers that do not sell to the coop) further supports
the hypothesis that the coop payments may be related to farmers’ savings. Appendix Table C.2 shows that
farmers who set saving goals are 20 percentage points more likely to sell to the coop (86% vs. 66%) and that
farmers selling to the coop are more likely to reach their saving goals.
Fourth, farmers report using money earned from the traders and from the coop for different purposes, as
shown in Appendix Figure C.1. The monthly payment from the coop is predominantly (almost 40%) used
to finance lumpy expenses in the dairy business, such as purchase of feed and equipment. The largest share
of traders’ daily payments is instead spent on current expenses, such as purchasing food (55%).28 In sum,
several additional pieces of survey evidence supports the results from the demand experiments: farmers value
the coop’s infrequent payments as those help overcoming saving constraints.
B.2 Survey Evidence on Buyers
As discussed in Section 3.3, small traders pay a higher price than the coop. This result holds in multiple
seasons and years. First, in the baseline survey for the randomized experiment described in Section 5, we
asked farmers about average trader price in December 2013, March 2014, and June 2014. These are 37-38
28The findings are consistent with the model of Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) and with evidence from
Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), who find that monthly transfers from an unconditional cash transfer program
are more likely than lump-sum transfers to improve food security, while lump-sum transfers are more likely
to be spent on lumpy expenses.
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KSh per liter. We also ask about the price paid by the best trader and the figures are very similar, consistent
with a competitive trading sector and low dispersion in daily payment prices. In this period the coop was
paying between 29 and 31 KSh per liter. Second, for our demand experiment, we ask farmers about trader
price in October 2014. The average price was KSh 38. The coop price in this period was KSh 31-32. Third,
for the supply experiment described in section 4, we asked traders about the price they payed for milk in
July 2017. Traders reported an average price of KSh 43, with average “high price” being KSh 47 and “low
price” KSh 41. In this period, the coop price was KSh 35-36.
There are many reasons why farmers may be willing to accept a lower price from the coop. First, 75% of
respondents report a sense of pride from selling to the coop. Second, farmers may take loans from the coop.
However, survey data suggest only 7.5% do and “loans” mostly take the form of advances on milk already
delivered.29 The coop also sells inputs at some of its collection centers: This may reduce transaction costs,
but 90% of farmers report being unsatisfied with the inputs’ quality and prices. Third, while farmers report
that most traders are available every day, the coop’s demand may be more reliable in peak production season.
However, since the coop does not condition present purchases on past deliveries, coop’s purchase guarantee in
the peak season cannot explain sales to the coop in other months. Fourth, about one-quarter of the farmers
report they have attended a training organized by the coop over the last year. Fifth, there is essentially no
quality testing done by either the coop or the large buyer, thus the difference in price cannot be driven by
systematic differences in milk quality. Sixth, farmers may bear a higher transport cost when bringing milk to
traders than to the coop collection center. However, average distance between the farmer and the sale point
seems higher for the coop. Finally, we note the cooperative does not make second payments at the end of
the year.
29The coop does not offer asset-collateralized loans such as the ones described in Jack et al. (2016).
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C Appendix Figures and Tables
C.1 Appendix Figures
Figure C.1: Usage of Milk Earnings
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Notes: The figure describes how farmers in the baseline (N=595) use milk earnings from the coop and from
other buyers, respectively. For each type of buyer, we compute the share of expenses on an item, relative to
the total earned by the farmer from that buyer.
Figure C.2: Trader Incentive Constraint Calibration: Robustness
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Notes: The figure presents robustness check to Figure 5. In the left graph, we vary the purchase price a
trader would be able to offer when paying infrequently. If part of the observed price gap comes from other
benefits the coop offers, the trader will have to offer a higher price. This reduces the γ threshold that makes
the trader unable to commit. In the right graph, we allow the trader to be βδ and show to which extent an
increase in time-inconsistency (i.e., lower β) reduces the threshold γ threshold.
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Figure C.3: Number of Days with Deliveries to the Coop
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Notes: The left (right) histograms present the distribution of the farmer-level number of days with positive
deliveries to the coop in the morning (afternoon) in a month (measured in May 2014). The sample includes
all the farmers making at least one sale to the coop (N=1,901) The figure shows that many farmers sell to
the coop (almost) every day of the month and (almost) never in the afternoon.
Figure C.4: Farmers’ Loyalty to the Coop
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Notes: The Loyalty variable is defined as the ratio between sales to the coop and production available for
sales among farmers in the baseline survey (N=595). Production available for sales is defined as the difference
between production and home consumption (including feeding calves). Deliveries to the coop are obtained
from cooperative records.
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C.2 Appendix Tables
Table C.1: Baseline Correlations
Set Saving Goals Reach Goals Coop Helps Goals Reach Less if Weekly Pyt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Cows -0.003 0.002 0.009 -0.026∗∗
(0.014) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010)
Avg Deliveries (kg) in June 2014 0.003 0.009∗ 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Loyalty 0.071 0.058 0.141∗ -0.041
(0.067) (0.057) (0.085) (0.075)
Any Other Village Trader 0.025 -0.046 0.100∗ 0.098∗
(0.042) (0.036) (0.056) (0.054)
Present Biased 0.087∗∗ 0.033 0.008 0.103∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.063) (0.045)
Difference Trust Coop-Trader 0.022 -0.006 0.004 0.036∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.016)
Saves in Saving Groups 0.137∗∗∗ -0.037 0.075 0.067
(0.039) (0.034) (0.048) (0.044)
Saves in Bank 0.074∗ 0.097∗∗ -0.016 -0.096∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.048) (0.040)
Regular Income from Other Occupation -0.004 -0.023 -0.113∗∗ -0.098∗
(0.040) (0.037) (0.056) (0.052)
HH member manages money not cows 0.095∗∗∗ 0.040 0.015 -0.033
(0.031) (0.031) (0.046) (0.042)
R2 0.075 0.049 0.056 0.082
Dependent Variable Mean 0.821 0.883 0.712 0.789
Observations 591 495 496 497
Notes: The table presents correlation between several measures of saving behavior and other farmer covariates, measured in the baseline
survey for the Price and Liquidity Experiment, described in Section 5.2. Avg Daily Deliveries are from coop administrative data. Both
production and delivery variables are measured in kilograms. Loyalty variables are defined as ratios between sales to the coop and production
available for sale (defined as the difference between production and home consumption, including feeding calves). A farmer is defined as present
biased if she is more impatient when splitting KSh 200 between today and next week than between next week and the subsequent one. Trust
for either the coop and the buyer is measured on an index from 1 to 4. Therefore, their difference can span -3 to 3. Regular Income from
Other Occupation refers to permanent employee, civil servant, artisan, trader, and self-employed. For each of the covariates, the regression also
includes a binary indicator for whether that covariate is missing (and missing values in the variables are replaced with an arbitrary negative
value). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table C.2: Farmer Saving Behavior and Sales to the Coop
Set Saving Goals Reach Goals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sells to Coop 0.206∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.255∗ 0.173
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.131) (0.133) (0.149)
Y Mean (No-Coop) 0.664 0.664 0.664 3.207 3.207 3.207
N.Cows N Y Y N Y Y
Village FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 408 408 408 302 302 302
Notes: The analysis uses data from the dairy farmer listing exercise, which targeted a random sample
of dairy farmers. The binary variable “Set saving goals” is not missing for 408 of these farmers. The variable
“Reach Goals” takes value from 1 (never reach the goals) to 6 (always reach them). The variable is defined
only for those farmers who state that they set saving goals. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table C.3: Price and Liquidity Experiment: Balance Table
Bonus Bonus+Flex Control P-value P-value P-value
[M] [F] [C] [M-F] [M-C] [F-C] N
Male Respondent .3706 .4765 .4123 .052* .825 .319 389
(.4846) (.5011) (.4948)
Respondent Age 58.39 54.96 56.12 .136 .323 .455 387
(15.90) (15.98) (15.05)
Household size 4.945 5.306 5.163 .133 .73 .425 395
(2.185) (1.928) (2.064)
Number of Cows 1.383 1.346 1.448 .849 .426 .28 394
(.6874) (.6754) (.6904)
Dairy Production (kg) 11.44 11.11 11.00 .894 .617 .803 389
(7.026) (4.948) (5.450)
Average Daily Deliveries in Sep 2014 3.963 4.051 4.216 .826 .199 .302 398
(2.257) (2.413) (2.262)
Loyalty .6632 .6582 .6713 .597 .881 .618 376
(.2476) (.2516) (.2529)
Loyalty AM .7814 .7669 .7611 .405 .659 .743 383
(.2225) (.2221) (.2210)
Loyalty PM .4978 .5057 .5429 .552 .742 .213 378
(.5004) (.4997) (.4943)
Hire workers for dairy .2229 .2516 .2551 .314 .625 .835 397
(.4176) (.4354) (.4381)
Any Other Village Trader .8367 .8807 .7755 .25 .468 .079* 396
(.3708) (.3251) (.4193)
Present Biased .1313 .1103 .1086 .62 .538 .816 374
(.3390) (.3144) (.3129)
Difference Trust Coop-Trader .7591 .9851 .9418 .158 .488 .523 358
(1.121) (1.126) (1.109)
Saves in Saving Groups .6418 .7302 .7395 .121 .09* .831 396
(.4810) (.4452) (.4411)
Saves in Bank .7260 .7105 .7938 .822 .274 .224 395
(.4475) (.4550) (.4066)
Regular Income from Other Occupation .2094 .2105 .2142 .961 .572 .897 398
(.4083) (.4090) (.4124)
HH member manages money not cows .2463 .2739 .3333 .694 .271 .146 377
(.4324) (.4475) (.4739)
Notes: The table reports summary statistics and balance tests for the Price and Flexibility randomized
experiment described in Section 5.2. Farmers in the Bonus group received an increase in milk price of 10
Kenyan shillings for afternoon deliveries. Farmers in the Bonus+Flexibility group received the same price
increase and the option to be paid daily. Avg Daily Deliveries are from coop administrative data. Both
production and delivery variables are measured in kilograms. Loyalty variables are defined as ratios between
sales to the coop and production available for sale (defined as the difference between production and home
consumption, including feeding calves). A farmer is defined as present biased if she is more impatient when
splitting KSh 200 between today and next week than between next week and the subsequent one. Trust for
either the coop and the buyer is measured on an index from 1 to 4. Therefore, their difference can span -3 to
3. Regular Income from Other Occupation refers to permanent employee, civil servant, artisan, trader, and
self-employed. The randomization was stratified by farmer location (i.e., four zones) and baseline delivery
levels (i.e., above/below median). We report p-values based on specifications that include stratum fixed
effects. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Table C.4: Price and Liquidity Experiment: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Post*Bonus (γ) -0.009 0.059 0.294
(0.066) (0.036) (0.182)
Post*(Bonus+Flexibility) (δ) -0.273 0.413∗∗ 0.046
(0.223) (0.197) (0.045)
Post*Bonus*Average Daily Deliveries in Sep 2014 0.034
(0.023)
Post*(Bonus+Flex)*Average Daily Deliveries in Sep 2014 0.128∗
(0.074)
Post*Bonus*Loyalty PM 0.093
(0.087)
Post*(Bonus+Flex)*Loyalty PM -0.314
(0.205)
Post*Bonus*Any Other Village Trader -0.235
(0.185)
Post*(Bonus+Flex)*Any Other Village Trader 0.228∗
(0.121)
R2 0.087 0.051 0.043
Dependent Variable Mean 0.082 0.080 0.076
Farmer FE X X X
Farmers 398 378 396
Observations 2388 2268 2376
Notes: The table presents heterogeneous treatment effects for the Price and Flexibility randomized
experiment described in Section 5.2. Farmers in the Bonus group received an increase in milk price of 10
Kenyan shillings for afternoon deliveries. Farmers in the Bonus+Flexibility group received the same price
increase and the option to be paid daily. We report results from the difference-in-differences model with
farmer FE from Table 3, Column (3). The dependent variable is the kilograms of milk the farmer delivers
to the coop in the afternoon. Refer to the notes of Table 3 for further details on the specification. Avg
Daily Deliveries are from coop administrative data. Both production and delivery variables are measured
in kilograms. Loyalty variables are defined as ratios between afternoon sales to the coop and afternoon
production available for sale (defined as the difference between production and home consumption, including
feeding calves). Standard errors are clustered at the farmer level. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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